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THE  PAST TWO  DECADES have witnessed intense competition among 
theories attempting  to explain macroeconomic behavior. Alternative 
theories have made claims with respect both to the purity of their 
methodology and to their ability to explain the "facts." This paper 
reviews the ability of three of the major competitors-new  classical, 
traditional  Keynesian, and what we call new Keynesian theories-to 
explain what we take to be the most important stylized facts. Our 
perspective is unabashedly biased: we believe that new Keynesian 
theories-particularly those focusing  on the consequences of imperfec- 
tions in the capital,  goods, and  labor  markets  arising  from  imperfect  and 
costly information-provide the best available  explanation.' 
Some Words on Methodology 
Because our objective is to persuade the reader why these new 
Keynesian  theories  should  be taken  seriously,  and  because  methodolog- 
ical issues have been frequently  raised in discussions of theory assess- 
ment  in recent years, we comment  briefly  on these issues. 
We do not provide here an econometric test of a well-articulated 
Thanks  are  due for helpful  comments  to members  of the Brookings  Panel. 
1. By "imperfections,"  we mean  deviations  in these markets  from  that  characteristic 
standard,  neoclassical  markets  with  perfect  competition  and  perfect  information. 
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version of our model and contrast it with a version of the alternative 
theories. Eventually,  we hope, such a test will be conducted. But tests 
of relativity  theory  were  not  based  on a statistical  comparison  of goodness 
of fit between the Newtonian and relativity views of the world. A far 
more powerful test-and  one that was actually used-was  to  find 
circumstances in which the two theories yielded markedly different 
predictions  and  to see which did  better  on these crucial  tests. That  is the 
approach  we take  here  .2  We  look  for  certain  crucial  facts  and  ask  whether 
they are in accord  with the theory. 
Economic theory is, from some perspectives, too rich. Essentially 
any function  that is homogeneous  of degree one in the full set of prices 
could be a demand  function:  economic theory  places no further  restric- 
tions on the form  of such a function.  Rationality  simply  does not buy us 
enough.  Conventionally,  what  macroeconomists  mean  by a theoretically 
derived model is one that is consistent not just with rational  behavior, 
but  with  some  strong  restrictions,  such  as that  all  individuals  are  identical. 
We know that  all individuals  are not identical,  and  it is here that  the "as 
if" story begins. We also know that a model with identical  individuals 
cannot explain some important  aspects of macroeconomic  behavior- 
that some individuals  lend others money or that some individuals  are 
unemployed  while others are not. 
Nevertheless, we can still ask whether such a model can explain 
aggregates  such as wages, prices, employment, and output. Again, to 
get any meaningful  results, we must further  restrict the model. If we 
allow  preferences  and  technology  to shift  in an  arbitrary  way from  period 
to period,  it is not difficult  to write  down  functions  for which  the number 
of parameters  is equal to the number of data points. We have an 
identification  problem of immense proportions. Innumerable  models 
could fit the data  perfectly. 
Studies of each of the principal markets of the economy provide 
natural  restrictions.  We do not want a separate  microeconomic  theory 
and macroeconomic  theory-that  is a point upon which by now most 
participants  in the debate agree-or  a separate  microeconometrics  and 
macroeconometrics.  And we know more than  just the results of cross- 
section  econometric  studies:  we know,  for  instance,  that  most  economies 
2.  We suspect that there is some loss function  for which our crucial-tests  approach 
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have not experienced  technological  regress, even if the rate of techno- 
logical  progress  may have varied  from  time to time. Thus, in looking  for 
crucial tests we  will examine a wide range of  stylized facts,  both 
macroeconomic  and microeconomic,  that characterize  business-cycle- 
related  behavior. 
To narrow  the range  of potential  stylized facts about  business cycles 
to a manageable  number  that  might  usefully  distinguish,  or  perhaps  more 
properly,  begin to distinguish,  the validities of various business-cycle 
theories, we applied  two significant  criteria.  First, we required  a clear 
indication  that the facts in question are true. For example, evidence 
concerning  the relationship  between output  and monetary  aggregates  is 
often contradictory.  In simple terms, some monetary  aggregates  may 
vary  procyclically,  some countercyclically.  However, attempts  to move 
beyond this insight to define more usefully the temporal  relationships 
involved have produced few confident conclusions.3 Second, we re- 
quired  a clear connection between the facts at issue and the different 
broad  theoretical  approaches  to explaining  business cycles. For exam- 
ple, much information  has been collected about the sequence in which 
shifts in orders, shipments, and output occur in cyclical fluctuations. 
However, while the data suggest the existence of recurrent  patterns  in 
this sequence, it is not clear how realistically formulated  traditional 
Keynesian, new classical, and new Keynesian models would differ in 
this regard.4 
3. An example  is the large  and  growing  literature  on the causal  relationship  between 
various  kinds of initiating  "shocks," both nominal  and real, and fluctuations  in output. 
See, for example, Christopher  A. Sims, "Money, Income, and Causality,"  American 
Economic  Review,  vol. 62 (September  1972),  pp. 540-52;  Christopher  A. Sims, "Compar- 
isons of Interwar  and Postwar  Business Cycles: Monetarism  Reconsidered,"  American 
Economic Review, vol. 70 (May 1980, Papers and Proceedings,  1979), pp. 250-57; Robert 
B. Litterman  and  Laurence  Weiss, "Money, Real  Interest  Rates, and  Output:  A Reinter- 
pretation  of Postwar U.S. Data," Econometrica,  vol. 53 (January  1985), pp. 129-56; 
Olivier  J. Blanchard  and Mark  W. Watson, "Are Business Cycles All Alike," in Robert 
Gordon, ed., TheAmericanBusiness  Cycle: Continuity and Change (University of Chicago 
Press, 1986),  pp. 123-56;  and  Ben S. Bernanke,  "Alternative  Explanations  of the Money 
Income  Correlation,"  in Karl  Brunner  and  Allan  H. Meltzer,  Real Business Cycles, Real 
Exchange Rates,  and Actual Policies  (Amsterdam: North-Holland,  1986), pp. 49-99. 
4. Arthur  Okun  examines  the predictions  of new classical  models  against  such  cyclical 
variables  and  finds  the models  wanting.  See his "Rational-Expectations-with-Mispercep- 
tions as a Theory of the Business  Cycle,"  Journal of Money,  Credit and Banking, vol.  12 
(November  1980,  part  2), pp. 817-25 (Brookings  Reprint  376). For a discussion  of such 
cyclical variables, see Victor Zarnowitz, Orders, Production, and Investment-A  Cyclical 
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While attempts to describe business cycles empirically  have a long 
tradition,  recent work has tended to concentrate  on postwar business 
cycles in the United States, and  many  stylized facts are based primarily 
on that experience.5  However, the major theoretical explanations of 
business cycles apply  generally  to developed industrial  economies. For 
this reason, the information  presented  below will focus not  just on the 
postwar  United States but  on other  developed  economies  and  on prewar 
history  of both the United States and other developed economies. Data 
are presented primarily  for the United States, West Germany, Great 
Britain,  Japan,  and Australia  (as a southern  hemisphere  economy with 
relatively mild seasonal weather changes), but also selectively for the 
Netherlands  (as  a small  open  economy).  Forthe  prewarperiod,  particular 
attention  is paid to the Great  Depression as an extreme and, therefore, 
potentially highly revealing  experience. The data presented are quar- 
terly, where available, and annual  otherwise.6  The stylized facts that 
emerge from both these data and a collateral  examination  of the large 
related literature  have been organized according to the three major 
markets  for labor,  capital,  and  goods upon which traditional  macroeco- 
nomic analyses have been based. We suspect that experts in the data 
may quarrel  with the detail of some of these facts. But we suspect that 
unless some agreement can be reached about what macroeconomic 
observations a theory is supposed to explain, there is little hope of 
reaching  agreement  about  what is a good theory. 
After presenting the stylized facts,  we  present three alternative 
5. For a recent survey, see Victor Zarnowitz,  "Recent Work  on Business Cycles in 
Historical Perspective: A Review of Theories and Evidence," Journal of Econonmic 
Literature,  vol. 23 (June 1985),  pp. 523-80. International  data  on business-cycle  charac- 
teristics were analyzed  recently in Edward  C. Prescott, "Can the Cycle Be Reconciled 
with a Consistent  Theory  of Expectations"  (Federal  Reserve Bank  of Minneapolis,  May 
1983);  John  B. Taylor,  "Differences  in Economic  Fluctuations  in  Japan,  the United  States, 
and Europe" (Stanford University, April 1987); Lawrence H.  Summers and Sushil 
Wadhwani,  "Some International  Evidence on Labor  Cost Flexibility  and Output  Varia- 
bility," Discussion Paper 1353 (Harvard  Institute of Economic Research, November 
1987);  and John  Pencavel, "The Classical  Unemployment  Hypothesis  and International 
Comparisons  of Labor  Market  Behavior,"  CEPR  Publication  110  (Stanford  University, 
July 1987). 
6. Quarterly  data  are used because annual  data tend to obscure  the impact  of cycles 
by averaging  over periods  that  typically  include  parts  of several  phases  of the traditional 
business cycle (for example, the year 1981  includes  part  of the recovery  from the 1980 
recession  and part  of the descent into the trough  of the 1981-82  recession), and monthly 
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theories-traditional Keynesian  models, the real  business-cycle variant 
of new classical theory, and new Keynesian theory-and  ask to what 
extent they address, or are consistent with, these observations. Our 
purpose is not to present a complete articulation  of these alternative 
theories. We confront  stylized versions of theories with stylized facts. 
We have every confidence that versions of each of the theories with 
sufficient epicycles could be constructed with sufficient degrees of 
freedom to be consistent with most if not all of the facts, but that is 
hardly  a test of a theory. 
Characteristics  of Business Cycles 
We now present stylized facts that any viable model of the business 
cycle should  be able to explain. The variables  are organized  around  the 
markets  for goods, capital,  and  labor. 
GOODS  MARKETS 
The traditional  way of characterizing  business cycles is as contem- 
poraneous  deviations from an appropriate  trend growth in the level of 
activity in many, if not all, industries-deviations that are reflected in 
deviations  in  the overall  level of seasonally  adjusted  GNP  and  that  persist 
for several quarters.  Table 1, which presents the variances  and lagged 
correlations  of differences  between actual  and trend  levels in the log of 
real GNP, illustrates  the cyclical deviation of output from trend. We 
calculated  trend  GNP by fitting  a piecewise linear  function, linear  over 
four-year  periods, to logged actual GNP. We did so for the complete 
available  quarterly  data for the United States, Japan, West Germany, 
Great  Britain,  and  Australia;  forthe period  1967-86forthe  United  States, 
Japan, West Germany,  and Great Britain;  and for the earlier interval 
1947-66 for the United States. In every case, serial correlation  of the 
trend deviations is positive, confirming  widely reported results in a 
similar  vein, by Edward  Prescott  among  others, although  the method  of 
trend-fitting  used here differs  from  many  of those used elsewhere.7 
An issue has, however, arisen over the interpretation  of the data 
7.  See Prescott, "Can  the Cycle Be Reconciled  with  a Consistent  Theory  of Expecta- 
tions," and  Zarnowitz,  "Recent  Work  on Businiess  Cycles in Historical  Perspective." oo  cro  oo  eit1o  ioo  - 
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presented  in table 1. The traditional  reading  of such data is that actual 
output tracks a steadily growing level of trend, or full-employment, 
output and, thus, that business cycles are temporary, if persistent, 
deviations  from  the  path  of full-employment  output.  An alternative  view, 
first  put  forward  by Charles  Nelson and  Charles  Plosser, would  produce 
observed patterns  of output  variations  similar  to those in table 1.8 That 
view is that trend  output  itself is simply  the sum of permanent,  or near- 
permanent,  single-period  shocks to output-in  other words, that there 
is a unit root, or near-unit root, in the stochastic process governing 
levels of output.  Under  these conditions,  output  changes  continue  to be 
persistent,  but  such  a characterization  of macroeconomic  reality  appears 
to require  a reinterpretation  of theoretical  macroeconomic  models. In 
fact, as described below, models in which there is either learning  by 
doing or fluctuating  investment in productivity-improving  innovations 
yield such random walk behavior in a context much like traditional 
macroeconomic models.9 Estimation techniques must, however, be 
adjusted  to accommodate  the nonstationarity  associated with the pos- 
sible existence of unit  roots. 
The simplest  way to do so is to examine output  fluctuations  in terms 
of first  differences  in  the log of GNP. We fitted  a piecewise linear  function 
to changes in the log of real GNP and examined  the standard  error  and 
serial  correlation  of the residuals-that is, the difference  between actual 
and  trend  growth  rates  in real  GNP. The piecewise linear  function,  again 
with  four-year  periods, was fitted  to growth  rates to eliminate  long-term 
changes  in growth  that might  otherwise  be interpreted  as positive serial 
correlation  of successive changes in real GNP. The results are also 
reported  in table 1. 
Here no clear pattern emerges. For the United States in 1947-66, 
1967-86,  and in the postwar  period  as a whole, successive deviations  in 
8.  Charles R. Nelson  and Charles I. Plosser,  "Trends and Random Walks in Macro- 
economic Time Series: Some Evidence  and Implications,"  Journal of Monetary Econom- 
ics, vol. 1O(September 1982), pp. 139-62. SeeFrancis  X. DieboldandGlenn  D. Rudebusch, 
"Long  Memory  and Persistence  in Aggregate  Output"  (Washington,  D.C.:  Board  of 
Governors  of the Federal Reserve  System,  January 1988); and J. Bradford Delong  and 
Lawrence  H.  Summers,  "Assessing  Macroeconomic  Performance:  An  Output  Gap 
Approach" (Harvard University,  March 1988), for recent contributions to and summaries 
of this literature. 
9.  See  Bruce C. Greenwald,  Meir Kohn,  and Joseph  E.  Stiglitz,  "Financial  Market 
Imperfections and Productivity Growth" (Princeton University,  May 1988), foranexample 
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changes  in output  are  positively serially  correlated,  suggesting  that  there 
is no immediate  reversion  to trend  and  a very strong  form  of persistence. 
However, successive changes  are  negatively  correlated  in Great  Britain, 
Australia,  Japan,  and West Germany,  suggesting  some slight  reversion 
to trend.  '0 
The important  result  to note is that, on average,  fluctuations  in output 
in the postwar  period  appear  to be ubiquitous  and closely similar  in size 
across national  economies. This point, emphasized by Robert Lucas, 
emerges  from  the surprising  similarity  across major  industrial  countries 
in the standard  deviations of output  fluctuations,  whether  measured  in 
terms  of levels or changes.  II 
In terms of levels, standard  deviations during 1967-86  differ across 
Japan,  West Germany,  Great  Britain,  and the United States by only 14 
percent. Even during  significantly  different  periods  the range  of standard 
deviations among these four countries and Australia runs from 1.48 
percent  per quarter  for Japan  to 2.04 percent  per quarter  for the United 
States. Data for the United States cover 1947 to 1986;  for the other 
countries, they cover periods beginning  in the 1960s  and going through 
1986. Excluding  the United States, the greatest quarterly  variation  is 
1.75  percent  for Great  Britain. 
Moreover,  the  ordering  among  countries  is sensitive  both  to the period 
of estimation  and  to the method  of calculating  deviations. For example, 
Japanese  output appears  to be slightly more volatile than U.S. output 
during  1967-86  but, as estimated by John Taylor, substantially  less so 
during  1976-86.12 In terms  of changes, Japanese  volatility  between 1967 
and 1986  appears  to be slightly  lower than U.S. volatility (see table 1). 
However, using  annual  data  and  polynomials  to establish  trend  growth, 
Lawrence Summers  and Sushil Wadhwani  find Japanese  volatility sig- 
nificantly  greater  than  that  in the United States.  13  Prescott  finds  approx- 
imately equal volatilities among all five countries covered here, with 
10. None of this  is evidence  either  way for a unit  root, because  reversion  to trend  may 
occur  only with  a long  lag. In  fact the debate  on this  point  is inconclusive  since  the relevant 
tests have low power. See Diebold and Rudebusch,  "Long Memory  and Persistence  in 
Aggregate  Output." 
11.  Robert E. Lucas, Jr., Studies in Business  Cycle Theory (MIT Press,  1981). 
12. Taylor, "Differences  in Economic  Fluctuations  in Japan,  the United States, and 
Europe.  " 
13. Detailed  analysis  in both  Taylor,  "Differences  in Economic  Fluctuations  in Japan, 
the United States, and Europe," and Summers  and Wadhwani,  "Some International 
Evidence on Labor  Cost Flexibility  and Output  Variability,"  indicates  at least partially 
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Japan  having slightly greater volatility than the United States.'4 John 
Pencavel, examining  annual  data for France, Germany,  Italy, Sweden, 
Great  Britain,  Japan,  the United States, and Canada  from 1957  through 
1984,  found standard  deviations  of changes in the detrended  log of real 
output running  from 3 percent (Japan)  to 1.8 percent (Sweden), with 
only these two outside  of a range  from  2.2 percent  to 2.5 percent.  15 Thus, 
despite widely different  institutional  structures,  such as those in labor 
markets  and  financial  markets,  there  appear  to be only minor  differences 
in output  volatilities.  16 
Examining  differences  in volatility  over time  leads to a broadly  similar 
conclusion. The standard  deviation of differences between actual and 
trend  output in the United States fell only slightly, from 2.27 for 1947- 
66 to 1.88  for 1967-86. Measured  using first  differences, the volatilities 
are almost identical  for the two periods. In historical  comparisons  over 
a longer  period, the traditional  view was that  pre-Depression  vol-atilities 
were substantially  higher than post-World War II volatilities.'7  More 
recently, it has become clear that a significant  part of the discrepancy 
has  been due to the statistical  methods  used to construct  historical  series 
on output  and  employment.  18 
An analysis of the extent to which fluctuations  in the outputs of 
individual  industries  have historically  been due to aggregate  national 
economic conditions as opposed to industry-specific  conditions that 
used. When  Taylor  examines  Japanese  and U.S. volatilities  for 1972-86,  he finds  that  the 
ratio falls to 1.5 (in favor of Japan)  from 2.3, while the ratio of European-Japanese 
deviations  falls  from 1.5  for 1976-86  to 1.1  for 1972-86.  For Summers  and  Wadhwani,  the 
United  States-Japan  volatility  ratio  rises from  0.32, when the log of GNP is fitted  with a 
linear  trend,  to 0.99 when  a quintic  trend  is used. 
14. Prescott, "Can the Cycle Be Reconciled  with a Consistent  Theory of Expecta- 
tions.  " 
15. Pencavel, "The Classical  Unemployment  Hypothesis  and  International  Compar- 
isons of Labor  Market  Behavior." 
16. Summers  and  Wadhwani,  "Some  International  Evidence  on Labor  Cost  Flexibility 
and Output  Variability,"  reach  a similar  conclusion  regarding  labor  market  institutions. 
Although  they find marked  international  differences in volatility, these appear to be 
unrelated  to any  other  differences  in the  economies  involved  (for  example,  wage  flexibility, 
size, and  the importance  of international  trade). 
17. See Zarnowitz,  "Recent  Work  on Business  Cycles in Historical  Perspective." 
18. See Christina  Romer, "Spurious  Volatility  in Historical  Unemployment  Data," 
Journal  of Political Economy, vol. 94 (February  1986),  pp. 1-37; Christina  D. Romer, 
"The  Pre-War  Business  Cycle Reconsidered:  New Estimates  of Gross  National  Product, 
1869-1980"  (Princeton  University,  February  1987);  and  Robert  J. Gordon  and  John  Veitch, 
"Fixed Investment  in the American  Business Cycle," in Gordon, ed., The American 
Business  Cycle,  pp.267-335,  for alternative  views. 216  Brookings Papers  oni Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
apply  to particular  industries  across national  boundaries  was carried  out 
by Alan Stockman.  19  By decomposing  the variances  in industry  outputs 
into a national  component  (common  across industries  within  a national 
economy), an international  industry component (common within the 
same industry  across countries), and a random  disturbance,  Stockman 
found that the national variance components were larger than the 
industry  components. 
By the same token, it should be noted that the impact of individual 
events like the Depression may vary widely across economies, as we 
will show later. 
Data on price changes  comparable  to the output  change  data  in table 
1 are given in table 2 for the period 1967 through 1986. The data are 
calculated  as deviations  of inflation  rates  from  trend.  Aggregate  produc- 
ers' price inflation  tends to be characterized  by more persistence than 
changes  in output.  Serial  correlations  in deviations  of price  changes  (that 
is, inflation  rates) from trend are uniformly  positive at one- and two- 
quarter  lags compared  with serial correlations  of deviations of output 
changes from trend that are as often negative as positive at these lags 
(see table 1). The magnitudes of the positive serial correlations in 
deviations of price change are uniformly  larger  than the corresponding 
correlations  of deviations  of output  changes  from  trend. 
One  obvious interpretation  of the greater  persistence  of nominal  price 
changes is that they merely track persistent changes in money supply 
levels that are generated,  in turn, by a money supply rule that accom- 
modates  past changes in price levels. An alternative  explanation  is that 
the persistence of price changes is due to rigidities  in the price-setting 
process (due,  for  example,  to menu  costs associated  with  price  changes). 
Evidence distinguishing  between these possibilities is  provided by 
Robert Barro and by Robert Gordon.20  They estimate the impact of 
unexpected money supply changes on both output and prices. Barro, 
examining  postwar  U.S. data, found that while the response of output 
19. Alan C. Stockman,  "Sectoral  and  National  Aggregate  Disturbances  to Industrial 
Output  in Seven European  Countries,"  Working  Paper  2313  (NBER, July 1987). 
20. See Robert  J. Barro,  "Unanticipated  Money, Output,  and the Price Level in the 
United  States,"  Journal  of Political  Economy,  vol.  86 (August  1978), pp. 549-80;  and 
Robert  J. Gordon,  "A Century  of Evidence on Wage  and Price Stickiness  in the United 
States, the United  Kingdom,  and  Japan,"  in James  Tobin,  ed., Macroeconomics,  Prices, 
and Quantities: Essays in Memory ofAArthurM  A.  Okun (Brookings,  1983), pp. 85-121. Julio 
J. Rotemberg,  "Sticky Prices in the United States," Journal  of Political Economy,  vol. 
90 (December  1982),  pp. 1187-1211,  reaches  a similar  conclusion  from  a rational  expecta- 
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Table 2.  Variation of Inflation Rates from Fitted Trends, Selected Countries,  1967-86a 
Standard 
deviations  Cor-relations 
of variations of inflation  Serial correlations  of 
from trend  var  iations  variations  from tr  end 
(percent  with output 
Inflation  measure  change)  variations  1 lag  2 lags  3 lags  4 lags 
United States 
Producers'  prices  1.87  0.562  0.365  0.294  0.152  0.279 
Intermediate goods  prices  1.49  0.534  0.683  0.302  0.038  -0.039 
Raw materials prices  3.49  0.377  0.068  0.114  0.118  -0.011 
Japani 
Producers'  prices  2.37  0.431  0.605  0.386  0.160  -0.014 
Intermediate goods  prices  3.03  0.506  0.713  0.396  0.157  -0.013 
Raw materials prices  5.56  0.392  0.595  0.336  0.051  -0.095 
West  Germany 
Producers'  prices  1.37  0.638  0.395  0.082  0.005  0.024 
Intermediate goods  prices  2.32  0.619  0.567  0.197  0.094  -0.055 
Raw materials prices  2.22  0.640  0.607  0.260  0.126  -0.065 
Great  Britain 
Producers'  prices  1.31  -0.059  0.467  0.233  -0.008  -0.223 
Raw materials prices  5.04  0.232  0.209  0.152  -0.063  -0.150 
Australiab 
Producers'  prices  2.79  0.158  0.159  0.244  0.121  -0.146 
Source:  Same as table  1. 
a.  Quarterly data. The trend was calculated  using a piecewise  linear trend over  four years. 
b.  1968-86. 
to unanticipated  money supply  changes is essentially complete in three 
years, the price level response continues  to be significant  at a lag of five 
years. In the absence of price rigidities,  the response profiles  should  be 
of similar  durations.  Gordon  performed  similar  tests over an extended 
period  for the United  States, Great  Britain,  and  Japan,  reaching  the same 
conclusion. 
Further  aggregate  evidence on price stickiness is provided  by James 
Poterba, Julio Rotemberg, and Lawrence Summers, who found that 
changes in the composition of the tax burden between income and 
indirect  business taxes such as the value added  tax significantly  affected 
the aggregate  level of real economic activity, even when there was no 
shift in aggregate  tax rates.2'  That finding  suggests that the associated 
21.  James M. Poterba, JulioJ. Rotemberg, and Lawrence H. Summers, "A Tax-Based 
Test for Nominal Rigidities,"  American Economic Review,  vol. 76 (September  1986), pp. 
659-75. 218  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
shifts  in the legal  incidence  of taxes were  not  fully  reflected  in subsequent 
price  adjustment  and  hence that  there  was nominal  price  inertia.  William 
Nordhaus  has also described  the stability  of prices  in the  face of changing 
demand  conditions  over the business cycle.22  Finally, Olivier  Blanchard 
notes the existence of significant  lags in passing on price increases 
through  the chain of production  from materials  to intermediate  to final 
goods.23 
Because these aggregate  data  are  supported  by microeconomic  inves- 
tigations  that  tend  to find  relatively  long  intervals  between  price  changes,24 
the available  evidence indicates  that  price  inertia  plays a significant  role 
in product  markets.25 
Thus,  taken  as a whole, goods markets  are  characterized  by persistent, 
ubiquitous  fluctuations  in aggregate  output, similar  average  magnitude 
of output  fluctuations  across economies, and nominal  price  inertia. 
CAPITAL  MARKETS 
Because information  on real interest  rates and actual  employment  of 
capital  goods is scarce,26  this section focuses on the cyclical behavior  of 
22. William D.  Nordhaus, "Recent Developments in Price Dynamics," in Otto 
Eckstein,  ed.,  The Econometrics  of Price  Determination  (Washington,  D.C.:  Board of 
Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System, 1972),  pp. 16-49. 
23. OlivierJ.  Blanchard,  "Aggregate  and  Individual  Price  Adjustment,"  BPEA,  1:1987, 
pp. 57-109. For a survey  of the price  rigidity  evidence, see Julio  J. Rotemberg  and  Garth 
Saloner, "The Relative Rigidity  of Monopoly  Pricing," Working  Paper 1943  (National 
Bureau  of Economic  Research,  May 1986). 
24. See, for example,  George  J. Stigler  and  John  Kindahl,  The  Behavior  of Indusirial 
Prices (Columbia  University  Press, 1970);  Dennis  W. Carleton,  "The  Rigidity  of Prices," 
American  Economic  Review,  vol.  76  (September  1986), pp.  637-58;  and  Stephen  G. 
Cecchetti, "The Frequency  of Price Adjustment:  A Study of the Newsstand Prices of 
Magazines,"  Journal  of Econometrics,  vol. 31 (August  1986),  pp. 255-74. 
25. Evidence on at least relative price inertia  is also provided  directly  in table 2. If 
changes in relative  raw materials  prices are independent  of changes in overall rates of 
inflation, the first-order  serial correlation  in raw materials price inflation should be 
approximately  p[var(s)/var(sJ)]  +  (0.25){1  -  [var(s)Ivar(sj)]}, where  p is  the first-order 
serial correlation  in aggregate  price inflation,  var(s) is the variance  in aggregate  price 
inflation,  var(sj)  is the variance  in raw material  price inflation,  and 0.25 is a factor to 
account  for the bias  introduced  by using  quarterly  averages  of monthly  prices.  The figures 
in table 2 yield the implied  serial  correlations  in relative  raw materials  price inflation  for 
Japan  and  West  Germany  of, respectively,  0.306  and  0.294. The actual  serial  correlations 
are 0.595 and 0.607, respectively,  which suggests that some degree  of relative  materials 
price  rigidity  exists-at  least in those countries. 
26. See Frederic  S. Mishkin, "The Real Interest  Rate: A Multi-Country  Empirical 
Study," Canadian  Journal  of Economics,  vol. 17  (May 1984),  pp. 283-311,  for  an attempt 
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investment,  or additions  to the capital  stock. As tables 3 and  4 show, for 
all  countries  in all time  periods,  investment  fluctuations  are  at least three 
times as large  as fluctuations  in output,  both when measured  in terms  of 
first  differences  and  when measured  in levels. Many  studies  confirm  this 
insight.27  Again, as in the case of output,  the United States is something 
of an anomaly  in the extent to which fluctuations  in first  differences of 
investment  are  positively correlated  over time, as they are  both in 1947- 
66 and  in 1967-86  (see table 3). 
The relative  amplitudes  of investment  and output  fluctuations,  how- 
ever, do appear  to differ  among  economies. Whether  measured  in terms 
of levels or first  differences,  investment  fluctuations  appear  to be greater 
relative  to output  fluctuations  in the United States and  Australia  than  in 
Great  Britain  and West Germany;  in turn, relative British  and German 
investment fluctuations  appear  to be greater than relative investment 
fluctuations  in Japan.  From 1967  through  1986,  the ratio  of the standard 
deviation  of investment fluctuations  to output fluctuations  is about 60 
percent greater for the United States than for Japan. Over a similar 
period  Australia's  ratio  is more  than  twice that  for  Japan.  Thus, although 
the Japanese economy does not appear to experience smaller output 
fluctuations  than others, the associated fluctuations  in investment do 
seem to be less severe. 
In terms of categories of investment, producers'  durable  equipment 
investment  fluctuates  less by all measures than investment  as a whole 
(see table  5). Business  construction  in  the United  States,  the only country 
in the sample  for  which  separate  data  were available,  appears  to fluctuate 
less than  investment  in producers'  durable  equipment.  For 1947-66,  the 
standard  deviations  of the  gaps  between  investment  and  trend  investment 
were 6.2 percent  for producers'  durable  equipment  and 3.8 percent  for 
business  construction.  For 1967-86,  the durable  equipment  and  business 
construction  figures were 6.5 percent and 6.1 percent, respectively.28 
27. See Zarnowitz,  "Recent  Work  on Business  Cycles in Historical  Perspective,"  or 
Prescott, "Can the Cycle Be Reconciled with a Consistent  Theory of Expectations." 
Prescott  found  a ratio  of investment  to output  fluctuations  of about  4.7. 
28. These figures  are for trends  fitted  to levels of investment,  but similar  results  hold 
for trends  fitted  to first  differences.  R. J. Hodrick  and Edward  C. Prescott, "Post-War 
U.S. Business  Cycles: An Empirical  Investigation"  (Carnegie-Mellon  University, 1980), 
find  similar  relative  magnitudes  for the United  States. Also, a similar  situation  appears  to 
exist in the United  Kingdom  and  West  Germany,  where  total  construction  fluctuations  are 
comparable  in size to producers'  durable  equipment  fluctuations  and  residential  construc- 
tion  appears  to be more  cyclically  sensitive  than  business  construction. C'e  r-  c1  cl  -  00  trO  C\ 
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Fluctuations  in consumer  investment  in durables,  for which again  only 
U.S. data were available, appear  to track those of producers'  durable 
equipment  investment. 
Residential  construction  (see table  6) and  inventory  accumulation  are 
the two most volatile categories of investment, with amplitudes of 
fluctuation  generally  greater  than  that  of investment  as a whole. 
Measures  of inventory  investment  fluctuations,  like those calculated 
for other categories of investment, could not be obtained because 
episodes  of negative  inventory  investment  made  it  impossible  to calculate 
complete series on proportional  changes in inventory  investment. The 
greater volatility of inventories than investment as a whole can be 
inferred  from the fact that noninventory  investment  fluctuates  less than 
total investment. Also, Alan Blinder  has demonstrated  the significant 
role that inventories play in business cycles,  at least in the United 
States.29 
THE  LABOR  MARKET 
As has been widely noted, variations in wages are at best weakly 
procyclical, while hours and employment  variations  are strongly pro- 
cyclical.30  If real wages are defined  relative to producers'  prices, then 
29. See, for example, Alan S. Blinder, "Can the Production  Smoothing  Model of 
Inventory  Behavior  Be Saved?"  Quarterl  Jour-nal  ofEconomics, vol. 101  (August  1986), 
pp. 431-54. Data on other aspects of capital  markets  over the business cycle, notably 
relating  to financial  structure,  show systematic  patterns  within  the United  States. Space 
limitations  preclude our exploring these issues, other than to note that, of the three 
approaches,  only the new Keynesian  speaks  to these issues. 
30. A large literature  investigating  the relationship  of hours, employment,  and real 
wage changes has developed since Keynes made nominal  wage rigidities  central  to his 
theory  of business  cycles. Early  contributors  to this  literature  were  John  T. Dunlop,  "The 
Movement  of Real  and  Money  Wages,"  Economic  Journal,  vol. 48 (September  1938),  pp. 
413-34;  and  Lorie  Tarshis,  "Changes  in Real  and  Money  Wages,"  Economic  Journal,  vol. 
49 (March  1939),  pp. 150-54.  More  recent  contributions  include  Patrick  T. Geary  and  John 
Kennan,  "The Employment-Real  Wage  Relationship:  An International  Study," Journal 
of Political  Economy,  vol. 90 (August  1982),  pp. 854-71;  Thomas  J. Sargent,  "Estimation 
of Dynamic  Labor  Demand  Schedules  under  Rational  Expectations,  " Journal  of Political 
Economy,  vol. 86 (December  1978),  pp. 1009-44;  Joseph  Altonji  and Orley  Ashenfelter, 
"Wage  Movements  and  the Labor  Market  Equilibrium  Hypothesis,"  Economica,  vol. 47 
(August  1980),  pp. 217-45; Salih  N. Neftci, "A Time-Series  Analysis  of the Real Wages- 
Employment  Relationship,"  Journal  of Political  Economy,  vol. 86 (April  1978),  pp. 281- 
91; Robert  E. Hall, "Labor  Supply and Aggregate  Fluctuations,"  in Karl Brunner  and 
Allan  H. Meltzer,  On  the State of Macro-Economics  (Amsterdam:  North-Holland,  1980), 
pp. 7-33; and Mark  J. Bils, "Real Wages  over the Business Cycle: Evidence  from  Panel 00-  -- 
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there  is some slight  indication  that  real  wages are  weakly  countercyclical 
in the United States and Australia. Otherwise, correlations  between 
deviations  of real  wages from trend  and deviations  of output  from  trend 
(see tables 7 and 8) are either  positive or effectively zero, as they are in 
Australia  when real wages are measured  in terms of consumer  prices. 
Also, except for Australia,  for which only a limited sample period of 
complete  data  was available,  hours  and  employment  respond  positively 
to changes  in output.  Similar  results  obtain  if trends  are  defined  in terms 
of levels rather  than  first  differences. 
The relative  magnitudes  of the labor  quantity  and price effects in the 
postwar  data are described in table 9. If output changes are generated 
entirely by exogenous shocks to either demand or labor productivity 
that affect only the labor  demand  curve, the relative sizes of the hours 
and real wage effects of output changes represent  an estimate of labor 
supply  elasticity.31  For the United States, the implied  supply  elasticities 
for all periods  are far greater  than  those obtainable  from other sources. 
For  example,  over long  periods,  as wage  levels have risen,  average  hours 
worked per week have either declined or remained  roughly constant, 
suggesting  an inelastic or backward-bending  labor supply curve. The 
temporary  nature of cyclical wage fluctuations  might account for the 
greater  elasticities implicit  in the response of cyclical hours variations 
(see table  9) as workers  substitute  leisure  in low-wage  periods  for leisure 
in temporarily  high-wage periods. However, microeconomic cross- 
sectional  estimates  of intertemporal  elasticities  of substitution  from  life- 
cycle models range  for primary  workers  from 0.1 to 0.45 in the United 
States to roughly  0.15 for the United Kingdom.32  For other countries, 
Data," Journal of Political  Economy,  vol. 93 (August  1985), pp. 666-89. For a valuable 
survey  and  contribution,  see John  Kennan,  "Equilibrium  Interpretations  of Employment 
and  Real Wage  Fluctuations,"  in Stanley  Fischer, ed., NBER  Macroeconomics  Annual, 
1988  (MIT  Press,  forthcoming). 
31. Strictly  speaking,  this will not usually  be true  because the labor  supply  elasticity 
would  have to be estimated  either  using  appropriate  instrumental  variables  (for  example, 
defense spending)  or on the basis of other  identifying  assumptions.  For estimates  of this 
kind  see Kennan,  "Equilibrium  Interpretations  of Employment  and Real Wage  Fluctua- 
tions." The  results  are  comparable  to those presented  in table  9. 
32. See Thomas  E. MaCurdy,  "An Empirical  Model  of Labor  Supply  in a Life-Cycle 
Setting," Journal of Political Economy,  vol. 89 (December  1981), pp. 1059-85; and Martin 
Browning,  Angus  Deaton, and Margaret  Irish, "A Profitable  Approach  to Labor  Supply 
and Commodity  Demands  Over  the Life-Cycle,"  Econometrica,  vol. 53 (May 1985),  pp. 
503-43. Other  estimates  of the  microelasticity  of supply  are  sometimes  negative  (see Orley cn  r-  CD  00  -  rn  00 
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Table 9.  Normalized Effect of Aggregate Output Changes on Hours and Wages, 
Selected Countries and Periods,  1948-86 
Regressioni  Regressiotn 
coefficient  of  coefficient  of 
percent  hours  percent  wage  Ratio of hours 
on percent  outpult  on percent  olutput  coefficient  to 
Country and period  changes  changesa  wage  coefficient 
Full period 
United  States  (1948-86)  0.224  0.086  2.60 
Japan (1970-86)  0.424  0.551  0.77 
West Germany (1960-85)  0.207  0.326  0.63 
Great Britain (1963-86)  0.345  0.405  0.85 
1967-86 
United  States  0.251  0.097  2.59 
West Germany  0.193  0.221  0.87 
Great Britain  0.383  0.445  0.86 
1947-66 
United  States  0.221  0.110  2.00 
Source:  Same as table  1. 
a.  Coefficients  are for normalized  regressions  in which  the  variation of  percent  output  changes  has been  set  to 
one.  See  text. 
the implied  supply  elasticities  in table  9 are  less extreme  (another  respect 
in which the U.S. economy appears  to be an anomaly).  However, they 
remain  above estimates  from  microeconomic  data  sets. A large  literature 
confirms  this general  point.33 
Tables  7,  8,  10, and 11 show  that in terms of the patterns of serial 
correlation  in trend deviations of changes in real wages, hours, and 
employment,  different  national  economies appear  to react very differ- 
ently. As table 10 shows, Japan is a clear exception in employment, 
perhaps  because of difficulties  associated with imperfect seasonal ad- 
justment. Even the U.S.  data have exhibited apparently significant 
changes  over time. 
Ashenfelter,  "Macroeconomic  Analyses and Microeconomic  Analyses of Labor Supply," 
in Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer, Essays on Macroeconomic  Implications ofFinancial 
and Labor Markets and Political Processes  [Amsterdam: North-Holland,  1984], pp. 117- 
56),  and  confirm  these  generally  low  elasticities  (Joseph  G.  Altonji,  "Intertemporal 
Substitution in Labor Supply: Evidence from Micro Data," Jolurnal  of Political Economy, 
vol. 94 [June 1986], pp. S 176-S215). Also MaCurdy's elasticity of 0.45 was not significantly 
different from zero. 
33.  See  Kennan,  "Equilibrium Interpretations of Employment  and Real Wage Fluc- 
tuations"; Hall, "Labor Supply and Aggregate Fluctuations";  and Ashenfelter,  "Macro- 
economic  Analysis and Microeconomic  Analysis of Labor Supply." Bruiice  C. Greenwald and Joseph  E. Stiglitz  229 
Table 10.  Variation in Employment Changes from Fitted Trends, 
Selected Countries and Periods,  1948-86a 
Standard 
deviations 
of variations  Serial correlations  of 
firom  trend  Correlations  variations  firomn  tr  end 
(percent  per  with output 
Colintty  and period  quarter)  variations  1 lag  2 lags  3 lags  4 lags 
Full period 
United States (1948-86)  0.61  0.604  0.459  0.164  -0.005  -0.125 
Japan  (1965-86)  0.51  0.428  -0.375  -0.073  - 0.353  0.723 
West Gerniany  (1960-85)  0.45  0.293  0.319  0.114  0.080  0.390 
Great Britain  (1963-86)  0.44  0.239  0.342  0.299  0.099  0.144 
Australia  (1976-86)  0.63  0.288  0.010  0.079  -0.307  0.213 
1967-86 
United States  0.57  0.653  0.509  0.234  0.120  -0.080 
Japan  0.76  0.131  -0.208  -0.228  - 0.216  0.422 
West Germany  0.27  0.219  0.418  0.050  0.032  0.143 
Great  Britain  0.44  0.271  0.445  0.364  0.207  0.114 
1948-66 
United States  0.65  0.567  0.419  0.098  -0.134  -0.224 
Source:  Same as table  1. 
a.  Quarterly data. The trend was calculated  using a piecewise  iilear trend over four years. 
Table 11.  Variation in Weekly Hours Worked Changes from Fitted Trelnds, Selected 
Countries and Periods,  1948-86a 
Standard 
deviations 
of variations  Serial corielations of 
from trend  ( -orrelations  variations  from trend 
(percent  per  with olutplut 
Countuy  and period  quarter)  vyariations  1 lag  2 lags  3 lags  4 lags 
Full period 
United States (1948-86)  0.55  0.407  -0.317  -0.025  -0.050  0.084 
Japan  (1970-86)  0.82  0.517  - 0.  031  0.172  0.023 - 0.100 
West Germany  (1960-85)  0.93  0.223  -0.047  -0.088  0.088  0.024 
Great  Britain  (1963-86)  1.25  0.276  - 0.252 - 0.020  - 0.294  - 0.089 
Australia  (1976-86)  3.33  - 0. 173  - 0.427 - 0.087  0.008  0.147 
1967-86 
United States  0.51  0.493  -0.148  -0.327  0.074  0.264 
West Germany  0.80  0.  242  0.002 -0.057  0.058  -0.062 
Great  Britain  1.37  0.280  - 0.272 - 0.028  - 0.015  - 0.240 
1948-66 
United States  0.58  0.382  - 0.418  0.201  - 0.119  - 0.111 
Source:  Same as table  1. 
a.  Quarterly data. The trend was calculated  tising a piecewise  linear trend over four years. 230  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
Table 12.  Output, Employment, Hours, and Wages in the Trough Years of the 
Depression, Selected Countries 
Index,  1929  =  100 
Industrial  Nonfarm  Nominal  Real wagea  Weekly 
Countty  Year  production  employment  wage  (CPI based)  hours 
United States  1932  52.7  78.4  84.4  107.5  72.0 
Japan  1931  92.1  96.9b  92.0  n.a.  98.0 
Germany  1932  53.3  71.1c  81.7d  104.0  90.1 
Great  Britain  1932  83.5  91.4  95.9  109.1  n.a. 
Netherlands  1933  84.0  85.0  89.0  111.0  n.a. 
Australia  1932  70.0  87.7  84.0  104.0  n.a. 
Sources:  U.S.  Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics  of the Untited  States: Colonial Times to 1970 (Government 
Printing Office,  1975); International Labor Office,  Yearbook of Labor Statistics,  various  years; and John T. Dunlop, 
"The Movement  of Real and Money  Wages,"  Economic  Jouirnzal,  vol.  49 (March 1939), pp.  150-54. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a.  Nominal  wages  deflated by the consumer  price index. 
b.  Does  not include commercial  employment. 
c.  Includes  agriculture employment. 
d.  This is the "official"  series.  An alternative series  yields  a nominal wage index of 75.4. 
Hours, employment,  and  wage behavior  in the extreme  conditions  of 
the Depression were in some ways anomalous. Table 12 describes 
employment,  wages, and, where available,  weekly hours  worked  in the 
trough  years of the Depression  for the United States, Japan,  Germany, 
Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Australia. Because of the rapid 
decline of food prices, real wages tended to rise significantly.34  At the 
same time, both employment  and hours worked fell, except in Japan 
where the Depression was extremely mild. Thus, the usual pattern  of 
cyclical real wage and employment  movements in the same direction 
appears not to have been true of the decline into the trough of the 
Depression.  However, wages in terms  of producers'  prices, where such 
data are available, often moved in more usual ways. For example, 
manufacturing  wages deflated  by output  prices fell in the United States 
between 1929  and 1932  by 12.2  percent  in motor  vehicles, by 1.4  percent 
in household  durables,  and by 2.0 percent in producers'  durable  equip- 
ment. Wages  in durable  industries  as a whole rose only 2.6 percent  when 
deflated  by output  prices. Employment  in these industries  fell roughly 
34. The Depression was also characterized  by nominal wage changes that were 
unusually  small by contemporary  historical  standards.  For example, nominal  wages in 
Great Britain  fell over 25 percent between 1921  and 1922  compared  with a 1929-1932 
decline of only 4.1 percent  (see Dunlop, "The Movement  of Real and Money Wages"). 
See also Martin  Neil Baily, "The Labor  Market  in the 1930s,"  in Tobin,  ed., Macroeco- 
nomics,  Prices, and Quantities,  pp. 21-61. Bruce  C. Greenwald and Joseph  E. Stiglitz  231 
50 percent  over this period.35  Thus, these industries  were characterized 
by the usual  pattern  of nearly  constant  or slightly  procyclical  real wage 
changes  (in  terms  of producers'  prices)  and  strongly  procyclical  employ- 
ment  changes. Similarly,  in Great  Britain,  John  Dunlop  found that after 
adjusting  for terms-of-trade  shifts, real  wages (in  producers'  prices)  rose 
only 2.7 percent between  1929 and 1932.36 
Data  on the  relationship  between  deviations  from  trend  in  productivity 
growth  and output  growth  confirm  a widely noted positive relationship 
between output and productivity growth.37  For the United States, 
nonfarm  business  productivity  data,  available  quarterly,  show that  U.S. 
productivity  changes are strongly  procyclical. The correlation  of pro- 
ductivity  with output  variations  was 0.617 for 1947-86  as a whole, 0.604 
for 1947-66,  and  0.643  for 1967-86.  Quarterly  nonfarm  business  produc- 
tivity data are not available  except for the United States, but rates of 
manufacturing  productivity  growth  show that in all countries,  including 
the United States, productivity  growth has been positively correlated 
with overall output growth and presumably  also with manufacturing 
output growth. The correlation  of productivity  with output variations 
during  1967-86  is as follows. 
United  West  Great 
States  Japan  Germany  Britain  Australia 
0.728  0.305  0.461  0.446  0.177 
For the United States from 1929 through 1932, nonfarm  productivity 
declined  with output,  falling  from  an index level of 100  in 1929  to 95.4 in 
1932. 
A further  labor  market  aspect of business cycles is illustrated  by the 
35. These figures  were calculated  from  data  in U.S. Bureau  of the Census,  Historical 
Statistics  of the United  States:  Colonial  Times  to 1970  (Government  Printing  Office,  1975). 
36. See Dunlop,  "The  Movement  of Real  and  Money  Wages." 
37. See, for example, discussion  in Arthur  M. Okun, "Inflation:  Its Mechanics  and 
Welfare  Costs,"  BPEA,  2:1975,  pp. 351-90.  Robert  Hall, "The  Relationship  between  Price 
and Marginal  Cost in U.S. Industry,"  Journal  of Political  Economy  (forthcoming,  1988), 
also notes that, in cases where an increase in output  can be identified  as being demand 
driven  (for example, due to an increase in military  spending),  the resulting  increase in 
productivity  indicates  that  marginal  costs must  be well below average  costs. This, in turn, 
suggests that, especially in a recession where capacity constraints  are not an issue, 
marginal  costs, as Hall points  out, are below prices. The U.S. data  for 1929  and 1932  are 
from  Historical  Statistics  of the United  States. 232  Brookings  Papers  on  Econonmic  Activity,  1:1988 
Table 13.  Variation of Changes in Unemployment Rates from Fitted Trends, 
Selected Countries and Periods,  1947-86a 
Standar d 
deviations  Serial  correlations  of  of variations  Correl'ationis  variations from  trend 
from  trend  with output 
Country and period  (percent change)  variations  I lag  2 iags  3 lags  4 lags 
Full petiod 
United  Sta.tes  (1947-86)  0.45  -  0.744  0.610  0.207 -  0.110 -  0.304 
Japan (1960-86)  0.12  -  0.173  -  0.302  0.100 -0.258  0.340 
West Germany (1960-86)  0.21  -0.398  0.635  0.234 -0.065  -0.253 
Great Britain (1960-86)  0.24  -  0.141  0.715  0.523  0.323  0.059 
Australia (1968-86)  0.35  -0.265  0.360  0.100  0.039 -0.189 
Netherlands  (1971-86)  0.37  n.a.  0.276  0.009  0.100  0.074 
1967-86 
United  States  0.42  -0.726  0.600  0.287  0.069 -0.151 
Japan  0.11  -  0.165  -0.174  -0.017  -0.244  0.199 
West  Germany  0.22  -0.406  0.629  0.352  0.106 -0.046 
Great Britain  0.26  - 0.173  0.716  0.542  0.333  0.050 
1947-66 
United  States  0.51  - 0.770  0.616  0.150 -0.247  -0.423 
Source:  Same as table  1. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a.  Quarterly data. The trend was calculated using a piecewise  linear trend over four years. Changes in unemployment 
rates are meastired as differences  in acti!  1 unemployment  rates. 
data in table 13. Cyclical fluctuations  in output and employment are 
associated  with persistent  cyclical changes in measured  unemployment 
rates. Table 13  describes  deviations  from  fitted  trends  of actual  changes 
in unemployment  rates. Excepting  Japan,  all economies, now including 
that  of the Netherlands,  exhibit  persistent  fluctuations  in unemployment 
rate changes that are positively correlated  over time.38  However, the 
international  differences in unemployment  are striking.  The standard 
deviations of fluctuations  in changes in Japanese unemployment  rates 
are only about one-quarter  the comparable  standard  deviations in the 
United States, despite the fact that  variations  in output  are comparable. 
And  the persistence  of unemployment  rate  changes  in the United States, 
West Germany, and Great Britain is  significantly greater than the 
persistencc of changes in Australia,  Japan, and the Netherlands. Un- 
38.  This may be a result of improper seasonal  adjustment of the Japanese data (note 
the strong positive four-quarter correlation). Four seasonal dummies were included in the 
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employment,  therefore,  appears  to be governed  by factors  beyond  those 
affecting the level of activity in the overall macroeconomy. A key 
question, however, is  whether these cyclical changes in measured 
unemployment  constitute a phernomenon  separate  from fluctuations  in 
aggregate employment that a well-specified macroeconomic theory 
ought  to explain. There  are grounds  for believing  so. 
An important  distinction  has been maintained  since the development 
of job search models between unemployment  on the one hand and 
nonemployment  (or perhaps more properly non-labor-market-related 
employment)  on the other. Unemployment  in these models is related  to 
active  job search,  just as measured  unemployment  is usually related  to 
willingness  to work as measured  by active job search. At a minimum, 
therefore, cyclical increases in unemployment  indicate an increase in 
the number of workers searching for jobs,  and that increase is  so 
pervasive  a business-cycle  phenomenon  that  it ought  to be explained. 
The  special  aspect  in this  respect  of cyclical changes  in  unemployment 
is illustrated  by the marked  difference  in the United States between the 
unemployment  effects of cyclical and seasonal variations in output. 
Work by Robert Barsky and Jeffrey Miron indicates that seasonal 
fluctuations  in unemployment  are far smaller per percent change in 
output  than  cyclical fluctuations  in unemployment.39  For example, from 
1948  through 1985, in the first quarter  of each year, U.S. GNP fell an 
average of 8.01 percent from the fourth quarter  of the previous year, 
while unemployment  increased an average of only 1.08 percent of the 
laborforce.  The  ratio  of this seasonal  decline  in  GNP  to the  corresponding 
seasonal rise in unemployment  is about 7.4, compared  with a postwar 
Okun's Law figure  of between 2 and 3 for cyclical fluctuations.  In the 
final quarter  of each year postwar U.S. output was on average about 
4.36 percent above second-quarter  output, while unemployment  as a 
fraction  of the labor  force was only 0.43  percent  below its second-quarter 
level, yielding  an Okun's  Law ratio  of about 10. 
The rise in unemployment  during  recessionary  periods is also asso- 
ciated with cyclical changes in the nature  of job separations.  As output 
declines, quits fall, and layoffs and other involuntary  separations  rise. 
The distinction between these two forms of job separation  is not an 
artificial  one. Studies of individuals  by Ann Bartel and George Borjas 
39. See Robert  B. Barsky  and  Jeffrey  A. Miron,  "The  Seasonal  Cycle  and  the Business 
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indicate that those involuntarily  separated  from  jobs suffer significant 
permanent  losses in future earnings.40  To the extent that cyclical in- 
creases in unemployment  (that is, job search while not employed) are 
associated  with increases in the incidence  of involuntary  job losses, the 
phenomenon  of cyclical unemployment  also raises the question  of why 
cyclical reductions in labor inputs take this particular  form and not 
others, such as hours reduction,  shortened  workweeks, and temporary 
furloughs  of fixed duration  that  are rotated  among  workers.41 
Thus, the cyclical behavior  of labor  markets  is characterized  not  just 
by generally  procyclical variations  in real wages and productivity,  the 
former  of which are small  relative  to procyclical  employment  and hours 
fluctuations,  but also by noticeable  differences  in real  wage fluctuations 
when measured  in producers'  as opposed to consumers'  prices and by 
countercyclical  unemployment  variations  that appear  to be representa- 
tive of a related  set of labor  market  phenomena,  including  layoff  and  quit 
behavior,  that are distinct  from cyclical fluctuations  in the overall level 
of labor  input. 
Alternative Theories 
Currently  fashionable  theories  for  explaining  business-cycle  behavior 
fall,  broadly  speaking,  into  three  categories.  First,  there  are  new classical 
approaches  that describe cycles as movements in Walrasian  equilibria 
in response to several varieties  of external  shocks. The first  incarnation 
of such a theory was the information-based  business-cycle model of 
Robert  Lucas.42  More  recently,  attention  within  this tradition  has shifted 
to real business-cycle models in which shocks to technology drive 
cyclical  disturbances.  Therefore,  as a representative  of the new classical 
approach  we will examine a simple real business-cycle model.43  The 
40. See Ann P. Bartel, "Earnings  Growth  on the Job and  between  Jobs," Economic 
Inquiry,  vol. 18 (January  1980),  pp. 123-37; and Ann P. Bartel and George J. Borjas, 
"Wage  Growth  and  Job  Turnover:  An  Empirical  Analysis,"  in Sherwin  Rosen,  ed., Studies 
in Labor  Markets  (University  of Chicago  Press, 1981),  pp. 65-90. 
41. This point is forcefully  made  in Robert  E. Hall, "Employment  Fluctuations  and 
Wage  Rigidity,"  BPEA, 1:1980,  pp. 91-124. 
42. See Robert  E. Lucas, Jr., "Expectations  and the Neutrality  of Money," Journal 
of Economic  Theory,  vol. 4 (April  1972),  pp. 103-24. 
43. The model  discussed  is based  on Edward  C. Prescott,  "Theory  ahead  of Business- 
Cycle  Measurement,"  in Brunner  and  Meltzer,  Real  Business  Cycles,  pp. 11-44;  and  Finn 
E. Kydland  and Edward C. Prescott, "Time to Build and Aggregate  Fluctuations," 
Econometrica,  vol. 50 (November  1982),  pp. 1345-70. Bruce C. Greenwald  and Joseph E. Stiglitz  235 
second category  of models  uses the traditional  Keynesian  nominal  wage 
rigidity assumption, recently updated by Stanley Fischer and John 
Taylor." We will use a simple variate of such a model to represent  a 
traditional  Keynesian  approach.  Finally,  a family  of what  we have called 
new Keynesian models grew out of a variety of attempts to place the 
assumptions  underlying  traditional  Keynesian analysis on a more solid 
footing. A variant  of this model that  focuses primarily  on imperfections 
in  capital  markets  will  be presented  as the  representative  of this  approach. 
REAL  BUSINESS-CYCLE  MODELS 
Real business-cycle models are built  around  two fundamental  sets of 
behavioral  relationships.  First, a representative  firm  maximizes  profits 
subject  to a production  function of the usual constant-returns-to-scale 
sort. In line with most of the real business-cycle literature, we will 
assume  that  this function  is Cobb-Douglas  so that 
(1)  Yt  = 
Etlok,l- 
, 
where  y, is real output,  it is labor  input, kt  is the capital  stock, and  Et is a 
random  technology shock. The firm  rents capital  from households at a 
rental  rate, rt,  and  hires labor  at a real  wage, wt. 
Second, a representative  household  maximizes  expected utility over 
an infinite  horizon, deciding  in each period  on a level of labor  supply, a 
level of consumption,  ct, and, therefore,  implicitly  on a level of invest- 
ment, it, that  determines  the evolution  of the capital  stock. The compet- 
itive equilibrium  in this model, which is also the solution  to the house- 
hold's  intertemporal optimization problem given  the  production 
technology, can be characterized  as a set of functions relating  the two 
state variables,  technology  (et) and the capital stock (kt),  to output  (yt), 
the level of labor  supplied  (1t),  and  the level of investment  (it): 
(2)  yt = y(kt, et), 
(3)  it =  I(kt,  et), 
(4)  it =  i(kt, Et). 
44. See Stanley Fischer, "Long-Term  Contracts, Rational Expectations, and the 
Optimal  Money  Supply Rule,"  Journal of Political Economy,  vol. 85 (February  1977),  pp. 
191-205;  and  John  B. Taylor, "Aggregate  Dynamics  and Staggered  Contracts,"  Journal 
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Once these real magnitudes  have been determined,  along with real 
wages, consumption, and interest rates, nominal  levels of prices and 
economic activity are determined  by the interaction  of real  activity  with 
a monetary  sector  as discussed,  for  example,  by Robert  King  and  Charles 
\Plosser.4s This interaction  serves only to determine  the aggregate  price 
level, since changes in monetary  aggregates  are neutral  in most recent 
real  business-cycle models. 
The broad  characteristics  of real  business cycles can be described  in 
terms of this simple structure.  Though the designers of these models 
have argued  for them  on the basis of their  broad  agreement,  in simulation 
exercises, with macroeconomic  data, attention  has not been focused on 
how well the models explain what we have identified as the central 
stylized facts of the goods, capital,  and  labor  markets. 
Goods Markets.  From an output market  perspective, the most sig- 
nificant  characteristic  of the real business-cycle model is that, both in 
spirit  and  in structure,  it is an extension of the usual  competitive  general 
equilibrium  model and thus shares the basic properties  of that model. 
The most important  of these is the general tendency for competitive 
markets  to dampen  the effect of external  disturbances.  For example, in 
a simple  two-good  model, the price increase  engendered  by an increase 
in the demand  for one good counteracts  the output-increasing  tendencies 
of the original  increase  in demand.  Thus, the basic motive force for any 
business-cycle  fluctuations  must necessarily  be an external  disturbance 
whose impact  is generally  attenuated  by the reaction  of markets  in a real 
business-cycle  economy. By contrast,  in  traditional  Keynesian  and  more 
recent imperfect-information-based  models, market  imperfections  give 
rise to rigidities  and  externalities  that, in turn,  often amplify  rather  than 
attenuate  external  disturbance,  as exemplified  by the traditional  Keynes- 
ian multiplier.  In the latter models, the critical  focus of attention  is not 
so much on the external disturbances  that initiate  cyclical fluctuations 
as on the imperfections  that transmit  and amplify  those disturbances. 
For real business-cycle models, however, success in explaining the 
nature  of output  and  price fluctuations  is inextricably  tied to the plausi- 
bility and consistency of the description  of the external  shocks that are 
necessary  to generate  realistic  cyclical fluctuations. 
There  are  two sources  of persistent  economywide  output  fluctuations 
in the simple real business-cycle model described above: persistence 
45. Robert G. King and Charles  I. Plosser, "Money, Credit, and Prices in a Real 
Business  Cycle," American  Economnic  Review,  vol. 74 (June  1984),  pp. 363-80. Bruce C. Greenwald and Joseph  E.  Stiglitz  237 
across time in the level of the capital  stock, kt,  and the serial  and cross- 
sectoral  correlation  properties  of the technology  parameter,  e,.  Of  these, 
the latter is far more influential  at the frequencies most commonly 
associated with business cycles. The aggregate  capital stock changes 
only slowly and smoothly. During  any particular  phase of the business 
cycle, which might  be of two years duration,  the aggregate  capital  stock 
remains  roughly  constant.  Thus, although  capital  stock movements  may 
account for longer-term  cycles, the cyclical persistence properties of 
real business-cycle models depend on the persistence properties and 
hence the nature of Et. 
The real  business-cycle  interpretation  of Et is as a measure  of the state 
of development of technology. This interpretation  suggests that since 
technological  developments  should  not be forgotten  and since negative 
developments in technology ought to be uncommon, an appropriate 
specification  of the process governing  the evolution  of Et iS 
(5)  et=  et-  1 +  tx  At :  ?0, 
where pt is a random  term  that may but need not be either stationary  or 
serially  independent.46 
In this form, in the absence of the nonnegativity  constraint  on pt, the 
real  business-cycle model does well in explaining  the patterns  of persis- 
tence in output  changes  in table 1. Indeed, the ability  to do so is perhaps 
the primary  recommendation  in favor of the real business-cycle model. 
However, without any restrictions  on the form or magnitude  of Et,  this 
success should  not be surprising.  There are enough degrees of freedom 
in  Et to fit  any  observed  pattern  of output  fluctuations.  A more  appropriate 
test, therefore,  is to ask whether  the patterns  of Et implied  by observed 
cyclical  behavior  are  consistent  with  the technology-based  interpretation 
Of  Et on which most real business-cycle models are based. 
In this regard,  the real business-cycle model performs  less well. The 
natural restriction that pLt  be nonnegative makes it difficult for real 
business-cycle models to explain instances in which aggregate  output 
and  productivity  fall. The most notable  of these is the Great  Depression 
(see table 12), when output  in the United States fell 30 percent  between 
46. Because new technology  is adopted  only gradually,  a more  appropriate  represen- 
tation of  equation  5 might be  E,  =  E,_1  +  0O(E-l  -  E,-,)  +  (1  -  )t),,  where  p,, now 
represents  new technology  improvement  and  (x  is the fraction  of firms  that  adopt  the latest 
technology  in each period (other diffusion-like  models yield similar  specifications).  As 
noted below, this model is more  difficult  to accommodate  to the observed  data than  the 
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1929  and 1932.  The factors responsible  for technological  regress of this 
magnitude  are difficult to identify. In addition, recessions in which 
output actually falls have occurred regularly in the postwar period 
without  any  clear  association  with  negative  productivity  developments.47 
Also, because the aggregate  shocks, Et,  are the sum of technology 
shocks over many  industries,  it is difficult  to account  for their size. For 
the United States, the standard  deviation  of the underlying  productivity 
shocks necessary to account for the observed magnitude  of output 
fluctuations  in tei-ms  of a real  business-cycle  model  is about  0.75 percent 
per quarter. If aggregate  output were composed of the output of 50 
independent  subindustries,  the implied  standard  deviation  of independ- 
ent quarterly  industry  productivity  shocks would be 5 percent, which 
seems to be very high  relative  to observed  data  on fluctuations  in industry 
productivity.  Consequently,  aggregate  shocks must  come at least in part 
from productivity  shocks that simultaneously  affect many industries, 
and these shocks are difficult  to identify. 
To the extent that the composition  of economic activity is similar  in 
industrial  economies, real business-cycle models with common  techno- 
logical  disturbances  and  similar  consumer  behavior  would  predict  similar 
magnitudes  of output fluctuations.  Again, however, the technological 
disturbances  of the real  business-cycle  models do not appear  to account 
well for the nature  of these magnitudes. 
First, if technology  is commonly  available  to all industrial  economies, 
fluctuations in output across major industrial economies should be 
closely correlated.  Yet Prescott finds  variations  in output  from trend  in 
Japan, the United Kingdom,  and Australia  to be negatively correlated 
with contemporaneous  variations  from trend in the United States (for 
German-U.S.  variations  the correlation  is positive, but small).48  Specific 
incidents  like the mild  Japanese  response to the 1980  oil shock are also 
difficult  to explain  in terms  of common  technology  shocks. 
Second, if the technology  shocks that  underlie  cyclical movements  in 
aggregate output are the sum of shocks to technology in individual 
industries, then national economic conditions should be affected by 
47. Even the oil price shocks of 1973-74  and 1979-80  that have been blamed  for the 
recessions in 1974-75  and 1981-82  do not appear  clearly to have represented  negative 
productivity  shocks of significant  magnitude.  Also, their impact was uneven across 
countries.  For example,  Japan  suffered  little  or not at all from  the second  oil shock. 
48. Prescott, "Can the Cycle Be Reconciled  with a Consistent  Theory of Expecta- 
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these industry  movements  rather  than vice versa. Thus, related move- 
ments across countries in industry  productivities  should account for a 
greater  part  of total output  fluctuations  than related  movements across 
industries  within  particular  national  economies.49  But  the data  Stockman 
examines suggest, as noted above, the opposite: national  factors seem 
to be more  important  than  industry  factors. 
Finally,  the real  business-cycle  models  provide  no explanation  for the 
apparent  degree  of actual  price rigidity.  On this point, the real  business- 
cycle models are silent. However, since they are based on underlying 
competitive  structures  with  perfectly  flexible  prices, the data  in this area 
run  strongly  counter  to the spirit  of the real business-cycle models. 
Capital  Markets. Real business-cycle models exhibit striking  accel- 
erator  behavior  and hence disproportionate  fluctuations  in investment. 
Most real  business-cycle  models involve capital-output  ratios  that tend, 
temporary  adjustments  aside, to be constant over time. Thus, a perma- 
nent change in productivity that raises permanent  output 1 percent 
should lead to a  1 percent change in the equilibrium  capital stock. 
Average gross investment, assuming  an average depreciation  rate of 7 
percent per year in the capital stock50  and a 3 percent average annual 
growth rate in GNP, and hence the capital stock, should be about 10 
percent of the capital stock per year, or 2.5 percent per quarter.  Thus, 
an unusual  technology-driven  increase  of 1  percent  in the level of output 
in a quarter  would increase investment about 40 percent (1 percent 
divided  by 2.5 percent),  if the increase  in the  capital  stock  were translated 
into an immediate  change  in investment  in that quarter.  Planned  invest- 
ment in a real business-cycle model should, therefore, be much more 
highly variable than output.51 Actual investment fluctuations  will be 
smaller  than  the changes  in planned  investment  because of time-to-build 
and  other  constraints. 
49. Stockman,  "Sectoral  and National  Aggregate  Disturbances  to Industrial  Output 
in Seven European  Countries." 
50. This estimate  may be high  since, for the United  States, the capital-output  ratio  is 
about  2.5 and  depreciation  is typically  about 12.5  percent  of output. 
51. Several  factors  mitigate  the extreme  fluctuations  in planned  investment  implied  by 
this simple calculation.  Higher planned  investment should raise interest rates and the 
relative  prices  of capital  goods. The extent of these effects will depend,  respectively,  on 
the degree of intertemporal  substitution  in consumption  and the elasticity of supply of 
investment  goods. Also, if some part  of any technology  shock is transitory,  the desired 
capital  stock will increase  by less than the change  in output. However, as noted above, 
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Recessions raise difficulties  for the model. If recessions are a conse- 
quence of negative productivity  shocks, then the associated reduction 
in the Capital  stock should  lead to negative net investment. But except 
in the Great  Depression, no such aggregate  investment  levels have been 
observed. For example, the level of real output in the United States in 
the fourth quarter  of 1982  was below the level of output for 1979  as a 
whole, yet at no time in the intervening  period does net investment 
appear to have been negative, as a real business-cycle model would 
appear  to imply.52 
Real business-cycle models are successful in explaining  the pattern 
of fluctuations  across categories of investment. Extending  the simple 
calculation above, planned  gross investment of type j for any quarter 
should increase by an amount [11(dj  +  g)] per percent change in out- 
put, where dj is the depreciation  rate for capital of type j and g is the 
average  growth  rate  in the economy.53  If this increase  in planned  invest- 
ment  is  spread over  kj period  for  capital  of  type j,  then  the 
relative size of actual investment fluctuations  will depend roughly on 
[11(dj  +  g)kj]. If kj is eight quarters  for business structures, and two 
quarters  for producers'  durable  equipment,  if the depreciation  rates for 
the two categories  of investment  are 1  percent  and  4 percent  per quarter, 
respectively, and if the average growth rate is 1 percent per quarter, 
fluctuations  in investment  in structures  relative  to equipment  should  be 
about 60 percent. This is approximately  the actual ratio in the data 
available. However, a similar  calculation  indicates that fluctuations  in 
residential construction should be  roughly comparable to  those in 
investment  as a whole, which is certainly  not consistent  with the data  in 
tables 3 and 6. And real business-cycle models do not yet provide an 
explanation  for the particularly  high  sensitivity  of inventory  investment. 
Moreover, being technologically based, real business-cycle models 
cannot explain differences in the pattern of fluctuations  in different 
investment  categories across countries  that are apparent  in tables 3, 5, 
and  6. 
The Labor Market. The assumption  of real business-cycle models 
52. This could be due to nonconvexities  (due to nonnegativity  constraints)  in invest- 
ment as a function  of productivity  growth  at the industry  level. However, independent 
individual  industry productivity  shocks are difficult  to reconcile with the size of the 
aggregate  shock. 
53. This  assumes  that  technology  shocks  affect  all kinds  of capital  equally  and  that  the 
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that households maximize  utility in a competitive environment  means 
that equilibria  always lie on the competitive labor supply curve of 
workers. The evidence of  cyclical wages,  hours, and employment 
movement  argues  against  this. As noted above in tables  7- 1, variations 
in observed employment  levels and in hours worked per week in all 
countries  appear  to be large relative to fluctuations  in real wages, and, 
in general,  there  is only a slight  tendency  for real  consumer  wages to fall 
in recessions. However, the relative behavior of wages and hours of 
work appear  to vary significantly  across countries, time periods, and 
special  circumstances. 
The detrended  wage-hours  relationships  in table  9 are  slightly  upward 
sloping,  but  appear  inconsistent  with  most  cross-sectional  studies, which 
find this curve to be highly inelastic. To reconcile the data with the 
hypothesis that firms  operate along the labor supply curve, one must 
argue  either that the cross-sectional  studies are wrong  or that there are 
important  shifts in the short-run  labor  supply  curve. 
Extreme instances like the Great  Depression also cast doubt on the 
degree to which workers  are always on their  labor  supply  curve. In the 
Depression, agricultural  prices fell relative to manufacturing  prices, as 
one might  have  expected, given  the  inelasticity  of demand  for  agricultural 
goods, and given the relative importance  of imperfect competition in 
manufacturing.54  As a result, real  consumer  wages appear  to have risen, 
especially  in the early  stages of the contraction.  From  1929  through  1932, 
real wages in the United States in terms of consumer  prices appear  to 
have risen by about 7.5 percent (see table 12). Yet rather  than rising  in 
response to the increase in real wages, hours of work and, therefore, 
presumably,  labor supply contracted.  Nonfarm  employment  fell about 
22 percent  between 1929  and 1932. 
A simple  model may help to illustrate  what was at issue in the Great 
Depression and in other contractions  in which real wages in terms of 
food prices increased,  or did not decline significantly  (see table 14). We 
need to distinguish  between the hours supplied  by employed workers 
54. That is, this change in relative prices is one of the aspects of macroeconomic 
fluctuations  that a good theory  ought  both to explain  and to take account  of. The theory 
that  we present  below,  as well  as other  theories  of imperfect  competition,  yields  predictions 
at  least  grossly  consistent  with  these  observations.  See Joseph  E. Stiglitz,  "Price  Rigidities 
and Market Structure,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol.  74 (May  1984, Papers  and 
Proceedings, 1983), pp. 350-55; Julio J. Rotemberg  and Garth  Saloner, "The Relative 
Rigidity  of Monopoly  Pricing";  and  Hall, "The Relationship  between  Price  and  Marginal 
Cost in U.S. Industry." 242  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
Table 14.  Variation in Deviations of Real Wages from Trend, United States, 
Selected Periods,  1947-86a 
Standard 
deviations 
of variations  Correlations  Serial correlations  of 
from trend  of variations  variations  from trend 
(percent  per  with output 
Period  quarter)  variations  1 lag  2 lags  3 lags  4 lags 
1947-86  2.06  - 0.143  0.817  0.565  0.318  0.045 
1967-86  2.34  -  0.090  0.878  0.684  0.475  0.225 
1948-66  1.58  -  0.263  0.689  0.350  0.068  -  0.198 
Source:  Same as table  1. 
a.  Quarterly  data.  The  trend  was  calculated  using  a  piecewise  linear trend over  four  years.  Real  wages  were 
computed  using consumer  food  prices. 
and  the number  of workers  employed. We first  focus on the decisions of 
a worker  who remains  employed throughout  the recession. Consider  a 
representative  individual,  with  a separable  utility  function  between  food, 
leisure, and other goods. (As we argued  before, we need some restric- 
tions, if utility  maximization  is to yield any interesting  predictions.) 
W =  jugU(F)  +  U,  -  ,Vt(L)]8' 
where  F is food consumption,  G is consumption  of other  goods, and  L is 
labor supply. The parameter  8 is the discount factor: future utility is 
discounted  relative  to current  utility.  Technological  change  increases  an 
individual's  productivity  not only at  work,  but  also at leisure,  as reflected 
in the factor  t. We postulate that qt is of the special form qt =  . 
(Without  some restriction  of this form, again  we have too many  degrees 
of freedom  to obtain  meaningful  results.) 
The first-order  condition  with respect to Lt  can be written 
U,  WtpF  , 
where wt is the wage and  pF  iS the price of food.55  Taking  the continuous 
time approximation,  and  differentiating  with respect to time, we obtain 
-T(d ln Fldt) + dlnvFldt = f' + fd  ln LIdt, 
where we have made the further  assumptions that UF is of constant 
elasticity, with elasticity  T,  V is of constant  elasticity, with elasticity fQ, 
where v  wIpF, and  where F is the rate of change  of  . 
55. The fact that he is employed throughout  means that we can ignore boundary 
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We immediately  see that if real  wages, in terms  of food, increase  and 
if the consumption  of food decreases, relative to trend, the supply of 
labor  should  increase.56  Moreover,  in this case, adjustment  costs appear 
unlikely to account for any temporary  deviations in behavior  from the 
optimum  since it is easy to adjust  consumption  of food.57 
This is not the only first-order  condition. There may be other first- 
order conditions that are consistent with the theory, but that hardly 
constitutes  confirmation  of the theory:  all first-order  conditions  must  be 
satisfied. 
A similar  result  arises, for instance,  from  the intertemporal  first-order 
conditions  for labor,  which we can write 
,tVt'/,t+  lV,'+l  -  8vt(1 +  rt)Ivt+1, 
where vt is the real consumption  wage and rt  is a real rate of interest in 
period t. We now see why we have introduced  the efficiency factor q. 
Without  it, in steady state with increasing  real wages, there should be 
constantly  increasing  hours  of work. If productivity  in leisure  increases 
at the same rate as the real consumption  wage, there will be constant 
hours.58 
56. Ideally, our data should  relate to consumption  and employment  of workers  who 
remain  employed  throughout  the  recession.  We  suspect  that  the variability  in consumption 
(in general, or of food in particular)  of these workers may be less than that of total 
consumption.  This general  point is also made by Robert  J. Barro  and Robert  G. King, 
"Time-Separable  Preferences  and  Intertemporal-Substitution  Models  of Business  Cycles," 
Quarterly Journal of Economics,  vol. 99 (November  1984), pp. 817-39. 
Note that  workers  who are "planning"  to choose not to participate  in the labor  force 
in-the  future  will still satisfy this first-order  condition.  If nonparticipation  is a "forced" 
decision, then the uncertainty  about future employment  is likely to lead to reduced 
consumption  in a recession  and  an increased  labor  supply. 
57. With  a broader  measure  of consumption  in the relationship  described  above, we 
face two problems,  as is well known. First, if durables  are included,  we need to include 
the services of durables, not the purchases. These are likely to be less volatile than 
purchases.  Thus  a time  series  of expenditure  on consumption  goods  would  suggest  a larger 
increase  in labor  supply  in a recession  than  a series  reflecting  "true  consumption."  On  the 
other  hand,  with  some goods, there  are costs of adjustments,  with  resulting  lags, that  lead 
to less variability  in the observed  series. Of course, if there  are costs of adjustment,  they 
need to be incorporated  formally  into the analysis. 
58. Note that our formulation  also provides  a reconciliation  of the seeming  inconsis- 
tency between time series and cross-sectional  studies of the labor  supply. The fact that 
hours  have decreased  slightly  over the past 50 years suggests  a backward-bending  supply 
curve  of labor,  while most cross-section  studies  show a basically  inelastic  supply  of labor 
for males  and  a highly  elastic supply  schedule  for secondary  workers. 244  Brookings  Papers on1  Economic Activity, 1:1988 
Again, looking  at the continuous  time formulation,  we have 
fq +  fldlnLldt  =  dIn vldt +  (8* -  r), 
where 8* is the pure rate of time preference (8*  1/1 + 8). Labor supply 
will increase relative to trend if the real wage is increasing  faster than 
trend,  or if the rate  of interest  is below trend. 
This first-order  condition  brings  out the intertemporal  substitution  of 
labor.  It emphasizes  that  what  is relevant  is the rate  of change  of the real 
consumption  wage and the real consumption  rate of interest. Again, a 
rise in real  consumption  wages, such as occurred  during  the Depression, 
should  have led to an increase  in hours  worked.59 
Consider next workers who cease  working. Do  they choose  to 
substitute a large dose  of  leisure during recession? The notion of 
nonconvexities,  associated  with  employment,  that  played  a role  in  earlier 
discussions of implicit  contract  theory has been revived in recent years 
in the context of real business-cycle literature,  though the objections 
raised  in the earlier  discussion  remain  equally  valid. Even if the noncon- 
vexities imply  that it is better  for individuals  to work an eight-hour  day 
than  for two individuals  to work  four  hours  a day, natural  restrictions  on 
preference (diminishing  marginal  utility of leisure) suggest that there 
should be job rotation, a fact reinforced by the provisions limiting 
unemployment  compensation  to 26 or 39 weeks.60  Moreover, with full 
insurance  for layoffs, individuals  would prefer to be laid off than to 
remain  employed;  few industries  exhibit  this reverse  seniority.61  Indeed, 
real business-cycle models do not recognize unemployment  as a phe- 
59. Furthermore,  in recessions, there  is evidence of labor  hoarding,  which  translates 
into more  on-the-job  leisure. Thus, the effective wage is highet than  the observed  wage. 
This implies  that  the supply  of labor  will increase  more  or will decline  in a recession  even 
less than  our previous  analysis  suggested.  On the other  hand,  in the context of long-term 
employment  relationships,  changes  in current  wages need not reflect  completely  changes 
in the discounted  future  value  of earnings  that  are  a result  of current  hours  of work. 
60. See Hall, "Employment  Fluctuations  and  Wage  Rigidities,"  for a forceful  discus- 
sion of this point. 
61. For  a more  thorough  analysis  of these problems,  in the context  of implicit  contract 
theory,  see Joseph  E. Stiglitz,  "Theories  of Wage  Rigidity,"  in James  L. Butkiewicz  and 
others,  eds.,  Keynes'  Economic  Legacy.  Contemporary  Eursopean Theories  (Praeger, 
1986),  pp. 153-206;  and  Richard  Arnott,  Arthur  Hosios, and  Joseph  E. Stiglitz,  "Implicit 
Contracts,  Labor  Mobility,  and  Unemployment,  " Working  Paper  23  16  (NBER,  July  1987). 
Theie are also nonconvexities  associated with search. Arnott, Hosios, and Stiglitz, 
"Implic  kk  Contracts,  Labor  Mobility,  and Unemployment,"  show that  these nonconvex- 
ities do ?nply that work reductions  may partia1b' take the form of layoffs, even with 
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nomenon distinct from overall fluctuations in employment. Again, 
observed behavior does not appear  to be consistent with the fact that 
workers  are on their labor supply curves and, thus, does not appear  to 
be consistent  with the real business-cycle model. 
TRADITIONAL  KEYNESIAN  MODELS 
The simplest possible traditional  Keynesian model consists of the 
interaction  of IS and LM curves that determines  an aggregate  demand 
curve (relating  output  to the price level) and a labor  market  equilibrium 
generating  an  aggregate  supply  curve.  These  can  be  written,  respectively, 
as 
(6)  yt = f  (M-lPt), 
(7)  yt=  g(W,  I/Pt), 
where Mt is the level of an appropriate  monetary aggregate,  Pt is the 
nominal  price level, Yt  is real output, and Wt  -1 is the previous period's 
nominal  wage, which affects nominal  wage levels in period  t because of 
the existence of multiperiod  overlapping  nominal  contracts.  Equation  7 
is based on the assumption that the labor demand curves of firms 
determine  employment.  The price  level Pt is assumed  to be fully flexible 
and  determined  so the goods market  clears.62  As before,  the implications 
of this model can be compared with the stylized facts about cycles 
outlined  above. 
Goods Markets. Persistent deviations of actual output levels from 
trend in output occur in this model through  the lagged impact of past 
nominal wage contracts on  current wage levels.  With overlapping 
contracting  periods, Taylor  has shown that deviations  may persist over 
extended periods.63  Since disequilibria  are rooted in the labor market, 
the effects of fluctuations  in the aggregate  price levels are transmitted 
across industries,  producing  movements in output that are highly cor- 
related across industries within national economies. However, the 
extreme  form  of persistence  of output  fluctuations  evident  in at least the 
U.S. data in table 1 is not consistent with the spirit of the traditional 
Keynesian  model. Some permanent  effects of any temporary  decline in 
62. Most of what we have to say in this section would apply equally  to more  recernt 
Keynesian  models  in which  neither  the goods market  nor  the labor  market  clears. 
63. Taylor,  "Aggregate  Dynamics  and  Staggered  Contracts." 246  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
aggregate  production  will arise as the result of a fall in investment  (and 
hence a reduction  in the future capital stock), but any such effect will 
likely be small. Extending  the basic model to incorporate  activities that 
generate  productivity  growth  and whose levels are endogenously  deter- 
mined might  lead to long-term  unit-root  persistence in output  changes. 
But it is not clear why temporarily  high real wages, the basis of the 
reduction  in  output,  should  discourage,  rather  than  perhaps  encouraging, 
such activities. 
Implicit  in the formulation  of the traditional  Keynesian model, with 
its emphasis on stabilizing  policy interventions, is the notion that the 
severity of business cycles can be significantly  alleviated  under  appro- 
priate  circumstances.  The current  rationale  for active government  fiscal 
and  monetary  policies  is based  on their  possible  value  in  avoiding  extreme 
fluctuations.  Institutional  arrangements  may  have similar  effects. Taylor 
has emphasized  the value of synchronized  wage setting (for example in 
Japan)  in minimizing  the persistence of nominal  wage rigidities.i4  Eco- 
nomic structure  should  also affect the stability  of the Keynesian  model. 
A small  open economy, selling  in world  markets,  should  be less sensitive 
to aggregate  demand  shifts than  a large  closed economy. Consequently, 
the similarity  of the magnitudes  of output fluctuations  in table 1 is not 
what would  be expected in a traditional  Keynesian  world. 
Persistence in rates of price change arise in traditional  Keynesian 
models  from  persistence  in rates of wage change  that  are due, in turn,  to 
staggered  wage setting  and  the existence of long-term  wage contracts.  If 
average wage levels affect prices and production  on an economywide 
basis, wage rigidities  may lead to the kinds of price rigidities  observed 
in practice. However, if contracting procedures merely fix average 
inframarginal  wages and do not fix either the opportunity  cost of labor 
subject  to these contracts  or the marginal  cost of incremental  workers, 
then it is not clear that wage rigidities  due to contracting  procedures 
imply  that  prices will be rigid. 
Capital  Markets. The traditional  Keynesian explanation  for the dis- 
proportionate  size of fluctuations  in investment  has been the accelerator 
principle, the same phenomenon  that yields disproportionate  shifts in 
investment  in the real  business-cycle  model. A change  in output  leads to 
64. Taylor, "Differences  in Economic  Fluctuations  in Japan,  the United States, and 
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a proportionate  change in the desired capital  stock that leads to a large 
change  in investment  when expressed as a fraction  of the much smaller 
average level of investment. However, in a Keynesian framework, 
where the original  changes in output are assumed to be transitory,  the 
strength  of this argument  is far weaker  than  in the case of real  business- 
cycle models, especially since the change in output is not due to any 
change  in technology, but rather  to temporary  changes  in real wages or 
aggregate  demand.  As the economy recovers, the demand  for additional 
capital  should  readjust. 
An alternative  version of the accelerator hypothesis relates to the 
timing  of investment.  Investment  is concentrated  in  periods  of unusually 
high output because they are also periods of unusually high capacity 
utilization.  Yet again  it should  be noted that capacity utilizationl  is high 
only temporarily.  With  substantial  delivery  and  construction  lags before 
equipment  is put in place, it is not at all obvious that  capacity  utilization 
will be high  when the new investment  becomes available  for use. 
For a long-lived  investment  project,  the expected return  over the life 
of the project  in question  should,  given delivery  and  production  lags, be 
relatively insensitive to  temporary current deviations of  economic 
activity from trend. Thus, small  price adjustinents  should be sufficient 
to shift  the demand  for investment  to periods  of low output.  As a result, 
if the marginal  costs of investment  are relatively low when investmient 
goods-producing  sectors are operating  below capacity, small shifts in 
investment  goods prices should  substantially  stabilize  investment  goods 
output.  It is not clear, therefore,  that  investment  levels should  fluctuate 
much more than output in a Keynesian world. Indeed, they might 
reasonably  be expected to fluctuate  less, or even to be countercyclical. 
This kind of argument  should apply relatively strongly  to residential 
construction.  The demand  for housing should depend on lifetime, not 
current,  household  income. Changes  in  current  output  should,  therefore, 
have little impact  on housing  demand.  Shifts in housing  demand  should 
be absorbed  as changes  in the prices  of the large  existing  stock of housing 
and  land. Fluctuations  in the level of construction  activity should, then, 
be determined  by the interaction  of a supply curve with changes in the 
prices of existing housing (partially  offset by changes in land prices). 
Since many resources involved in residential  construction  appear  to be 
relatively highly specialized, marginal costs  in construction should 
decline significantly  with the level of activity. Thus, small cyclical 248  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1988 
changes in housing prices (net of land prices) should lead to either 
countercyclical,  or at most small  procyclical  output  fluctuations  along  a 
relatively  inelastic supply curve. Yet residential  construction  is, in the 
United States at least, one of the most volatile investment  sectors. 
The problems posed by investmn-nt  in inventories are by now well 
known.65  With  concave production  functions,  inventories  serve a buffer 
stock role. With  labor  underemployed  in a recession, it should be used 
to add to inventories, given that shadow real product wages are, if 
anything,  slightly  lower than  normal. 
In the absence of adjustment  costs for production,66  and ignoring 
storage  costs, production  should  be such that the real marginal  costs of 
production  are the same each period, that is, 
vplFt  =  vP  l'/F+  1  (1  +  rP), 
where vP  is the real product  wage, rP  is the real product  interest rate, 
and F' is the marginal  product  of labor.67  (When there are changes in 
relative prices, the real product interest rate may differ from the real 
consumer  interest  rate.) Expressing  this in continuous  time, we have, in 
the obvious notation, 
d ln  VP/dt  -  rP  =  -(I  /o)d  In L/dt, 
where (x  is the elasticity of demand  for labor  with respect to the wage. 
(With  a Cobb-Douglas  production  function, it is the reciprocal  of one 
minus  the share  of labor.)  Given observed small  variations  in real  wages 
and interest rates, employment should vary little, with the difference 
between output  and sales going into or out of inventories. But not only 
is production  not smoothed, as the theory of intertemporal  substitution 
suggests  it ought  to be, but inventories  are reduced  in recessions.68 
The  Labor  Market. As tables  7 and  8 show, movements  in real  wages 
are generally procyclical. In the postwar period, only in the United 
States for the period 1948-66 and in terms of producers'  prices do real 
wages appear  to have varied  countercyclically.  Before that, only in the 
65. Blinder,  "Can  the  Production  Smoothing  Model  of Inventory  Behavior  Be Saved?" 
66. Adjustment  costs simply  strengthen  the presumption  for production  smoothing. 
67. We assume  intertemporal  separability  in production  and  that  we are  in an interior 
solution  with  positive  inventory  stocks. 
68. Inventories  of inputs  can be thought  of as part  of the production  process, and, as 
such, when production  decreases, the demand  for these inventories  will decrease. The 
paradox  arises  in the context  of inventories  of finished  goods. Bruce C. Greenwald  and Joseph E. Stiglitz  249 
Great  Depression  do real  wages appear  to have varied  countercyclically, 
and those were consumer price wages, not, in many industries, the 
critical producers' price wage. Higher levels of output are generally 
associated with higher levels of real wages and are almost invariably 
associated with higher,  not lower, levels of productivity  per man-hour. 
The latter  was true even during  the Depression. The existence of fixed 
costs could account  for the productivity  variations  since these are  given 
in average, not marginal,  terms. However, the wage data run directly 
counter  to the predictions  of the traditional  Keynesian  model. 
One of the earliest objections to traditional  Keynesian theory was 
that the evidence suggested that the firm  was not on its labor demand 
curve.  If, for  instance,  we postulate  a Cobb-Douglas  production  function, 
with  a coefficient  on labor  of 0.75, and  a 25  percent  decline  in labor  input, 
as in the Great  Depression,  then  the real  product  wage should  have risen 
by 6 percent. And the real product interest rate (marginal  return on 
capital) should have fallen 30 percent. If, as much of the econometric 
evidence suggests, the elasticity of substitution  is less than unity, then 
real wages should  have risen even more. If the elasticity of substitution 
was 0.6, and real interest rates remained  the same, then if the only 
disturbance  to the economy was a productivity  shock, real  wages should 
have risen more than 40 percent. (If the real marginal  return  to capital 
decreased, then the increase in real product wages should have been 
even greater.) 
Dunlop and Tarshis pointed out that there was no evidence of this 
kind  in the Depression, and the evidence presented  above suggests that 
real product  wages fall when output and hours fall.69  There are three 
possible approaches to take at this point in adapting  the traditional 
Keynesian  model. One is to assume that the firms  are not on their  labor 
demand  curve.70  The main  objection  to this has not been empirical,  but 
theoretical:  no convincing  explanation  for why firms  do not lower their 
prices (within a competitive framework)  to increase sales has been 
provided. 
69. See Dunlop,  "The  Movement  of Real  and  Money  Wages";  and  Tarshis,  "Changes 
in Real  and  Money  Wages." 
70. This is the approach  taken by Alvin M. Hansen, Business Cycles and National 
Income, expanded edition (Norton, 1951);  Robert M. Solow and Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
"Output,  Employment,  and Wages  in the Short  Run," Quarterly  Journal  of Economics, 
vol 82 (November  1968),  pp. 537-60;  Robert  J. Barro  and  Herschel  I. Grossman,  Money, 
Employment,  and Inflation  (Cambridge  University  Press, 1976);  and the subsequent  fix- 
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The second is to attack the data: the wage series do not reflect the 
marginal  wage paid. But upon closer examination,  this approach  exac- 
erbates the problem,  for two reasons. In implicit  contract theory, the 
wage received can be thought  of as containing  a payment  to or from an 
"insurance"  fund. In a recession, the wage received is greater than  the 
marginal  product,  because of a payment  to the individual.  Moreover,  in 
booms, firms  pay overtime, and thus the marginal  wage is considerably 
in excess of the average  wage. 
The third  is to assume that the demand  curve for labor  is not derived 
from the aggregation  of simple competitive market  demand curves of 
the conventional kind. Two approaches have been taken here. One 
approach  is based on capital market  imperfections  and is discussed in 
the next section. Alternatively,  we can assume imperfect  competition. 
Assume the ith firm's  production  function  (with  fixed capital)  is F(L1), so 
that  with competition,  vP = F', where vP  is the real  product  wage. Then 
under  imperfect  competition,  firms  will set71 
(8)  vP =  F'lm. 
If the markup  were constant, there would be little difference  between 
the competitive analysis and the analysis with imperfect  competition. 
Equation  8 allows  us to define  an  aggregate  demand  for  labor  relationship. 
As usual, with imperfect  competition,  we should  not think  of this as  just 
a demand  curve, but as the aggregation  of the equilibrium  employment 
conditions  of the firms  in the economy. 
It is possible that  m changes  over the business  cycle in a way that  can 
account for the observations. For a simple monopolistic competition 
model  in which  m is just  1/[1  -  (l/elasticity  of  demand)],  there are 
demand structures  for which the elasticity varies with consumption 
levels in a way that  is consistent  with  the aggregate  observations.  Robert 
Hall, while arguing  convincingly that the data simply cannot be ac- 
counted for by a competitive supply model, has put forward a more 
sophisticated version of this hypothesis, though there is little cross- 
sectional econometric evidence to support the view that preferences 
have the required  shapes.72  Stiglitz  has considered  alternative  versions 
of the imperfect  competition  model that might  give rise to the kinds of 
movements  in the perceived  elasticity  of demand  facing  firms  that  would 
71. This is just another  way of writing  the familiar  markup  equation.  The marginal 
labor  cost of producing  an extra  unit  is wIF'. Hence  p = mwlF'. 
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be consistent with the aggregate  data.73  It should be noted that some 
versions of the imperfect  competition  model predict  just the opposite 
movements in the elasticities of demand-that competition  breaks out 
more fiercely as demand  falls (witness OPEC)-and that markups  thus 
decrease in recessions. 
The data presented in the first part of this paper  raise doubts about 
the validity  of at least the simpler  versions of the imperfect  competition 
theories. Presumably the importance of these effects should differ 
markedly  across countries, and, in particular,  small open economies 
should  face fairly  elastic  demands  for at least many  of their  commodities. 
Yet the puzzle we have identified  is ubiquitous:  all of the countries 
exhibit large changes in labor inputs (employment  plus hours) relative 
to variations  in real product  wages and, more strikingly,  variations  in 
output  of similar  magnitudes. 
NEW  KEYNESIAN  THEORY 
New  Keynesian theories have modified traditional  Keynesian as- 
sumptions in a number of ways. The different modifications  can be 
grouped by the market on which they have focused. Three broad 
theoretical  approaches  have focused on labor markets, concentrating 
separately  on implicit  contracts, search, and efficiency  wages. Another 
set of approaches  has focused on product  markets, seeking to explain 
price rigidities  in terms of menu (adjustment)  costs or imperfect  com- 
petition.74  Still another set of theories has focused on capital markets 
and has stressed the roles of credit rationing  and equity rationing.75  In 
terms of these theories, the different  markets  are not completely sepa- 
73. Stiglitz,  "Price  Rigidity  and  Market  Structure." 
74. For menu costs, see George  A. Akerlof  and Janet  Y. Yellen, "A Near-Rational 
Model of the Business Cycle, with Wage and Price Inertia," Quarterly  Journal of 
Economics,  vol. 100  (Supplement  1985),  pp. 823-38;  N. Gregory  Mankiw,  "Small  Menu 
Costs and Large Business Cycles: A Macroeconomic  Model of Monopoly," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics,  vol.  100 (May 1985), pp. 529-37; and Lawrence J. Ball and David 
Romer,  "Sticky  Prices  as Co-ordination  Failures"  (Princeton  University,  July 1987).  For 
imperfect  competition,  see Hall, "The Relationship  between Price  and Marginal  Cost in 
U.S. Industry";  Stiglitz,  "Price  Rigidity  and  Market  Structure";  Rotemberg  and  Saloner, 
"The  Relative  Rigidity  of Monopoly  Pricing";  Martin  L. Weitzman,  "Increasing  Returns 
and  the Foundations  of Unemployment  Theory," Economic  Journal,  vol. 92 (December 
1982),  pp. 787-804;  and  Oliver  Hart,  "A Model  of Imperfect  Competition  with Keynesian 
Features,"  Quarterly Journal of Economics,  vol. 97 (February 1982), pp. 109-38. 
75. See, for example,  Bruce  C. Greenwald  and  Joseph  E. Stiglitz, "Financial  Market 
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rate. Versions of the equity rationing  theories have, accordingly,  been 
used  to explain  both  labor  market  behavior  (wage  rigidities  and  persistent 
unemployment)  and pricing behavior. Nor are the different theories 
mutually  exclusive. Models incorporating  search, implicit contracts, 
and  efficiency  wage considerations  have been constructed.76 
Hlowever,  to develop as simple  a variant  of this model  as possible, we 
focus on one built around equity rationing  constraints and efficiency 
wages. Equity rationing-the fact that firms  have only limited  recourse 
to sales of new equity as a means  of raising  external  capital-arises in a 
world of imperfect  information  because of both adverse selection and 
moral  hazard.  Adverse selection occurs when the decisionmakers  of a 
firm  have information  about its future  prospects that is superior  to that 
of potential equity buyers. A decision to sell new equity under those 
conditions suggests that, on average, the views of the firm's managers 
are less optimistic  than the views of the market  at large (otherwise  the 
firm's  market  value would be less than that indicated  by the managers' 
superior  information,  and selling  new equity  would  be inadvisable).  The 
announcement  of a new equity issue should thus lead to a downward 
revaluation  of the firm  by the market.  The potential  for such  a downward 
revaluation  should  act as a cost, inhibiting  new equity sales.77 
The consequences of equity rationing  depend upon the assumption 
that the decisionmakers  of a firm  are averse to the risks of bankruptcy 
or more generally  that they are averse to the risks of deterioration  in 
their equity positions.78  Then, in the absence of a full set of futures 
markets,  production  lags mean that every production  decision is a risk 
decision. Firrns  pay factors of production  at fixed rates and obtain an 
output  whose value is uncertain,  being determined  only when it is sold 
in the future. The stronger  a firm's equity base, the smaller  the incre- 
mental risk associated with any such increase in output  will be. Thus, 
the marginal  cost of additional  output, including  the marginal  increase 
in risk borne by the firm's decisionmakers,  falls when a firm's equity 
76. See Arnott, Hosios, and Stiglitz. "Implicit  Contracts,  Labor  Mobility,  and Un- 
employment." 
77. For the moral  hazard  argument  against  equity finance, see William  H. Meckling 
and Michael  C. Jensen, "TTheory  of the Firm:  Managerial  Behavior,  Agency Costs and 
Ownership  Structure,"  Jou-rnal of Financial  Economics, vol. 3 (June 1976),  pp. 305-60; 
Joseph  E. Stiglitz,  "Incentives  and  Risk  Sharing  in Sharecropping,"  Review  of Economic 
Studies,  vol. 41 (April  1974),  pp. 219-55. 
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position  improves  and  rises when  it deteriorates.  In labor  demand  terms, 
the marginal  product of labor, net of the cost of additional  risk that 
employment  of the workers  entails, rises when the equity  position  of the 
firm  improves  and  falls when it deteriorates. 
Investment  in this context can be thought  of as current  payment  for 
inputs in return  for a stream of benefits of uncertain  value that may 
stretch  far into the future. The marginal  product  of capital, again  net of 
the cost of incremental  risk associated with investment, will, like the 
marginal  product  of labor,  rise  as the equity  position  of the firm  improves 
and  fall as the equity  position  of the firm  deteriorates. 
Thus, the impact  of imperfect  information-related  equity  constraints 
can be summarized  by writing aggregate  real supply and investment 
functions  of the form 
yt = y(at),  y' > O 
it =  i(a,),  i'  >  0, 
where  Y,  is real  output,  it  is real  investment,  and  at  is the real  level of firm 
equity  holdings. 
The aggregate  demand  for labor, like the aggregate  production  func- 
tion, depends on the level of aggregate  equity. Equilibrium  in the labor 
market  is then determined  by the intersection  of this demand  function 
with  an  efficiency  wage  condition.  Efficiency  wage  conditions  arise  when 
the level of labor  productivity  depends positively on the wage level, as 
it may because wage levels affect turnover  costs, because higher  wage 
levels elicit more  effort  from  workers,  or because higher  wages attract  a 
higher-quality applicant pool.79  The important consequence  of the de- 
79.  For turnover costs,  see J. E. Stiglitz, "Aiternative Theories of Wage Determination 
and Unemployment in LDC' : The Labor Turnover Model, " Quarterly Journal ofEconom- 
ics, vol. 88 (May 1974), pp. 194-227; and Steven C. Salop, "A Model of the Natural Rate 
of Unemployment,"  American Economic Reviev,  vol. 69 (March 1979), pp. 117-25. 
For worker effort, see Carl Shapiro and Joseph E. Stiglitz,  "Equilibrium Unemploy- 
ment as a Worker Discipline  Device,"  American Economic  Revieiv, vol. 74 (June 1984), 
pp. 433-44;  and Jeremy I. Bulow and Lawrence  H. Summers,  "A Theory of Dual Labor 
Markets with Applications  to Industrial Policy,  Discrimination,  and Keynesian  Unem- 
ployment, " Journal of Labor Economics,  vol. 4 (July 1986), pp. 376-414. 
For the quality of the applicant pool, see Andrew Weiss,  "Job Queues and Lay-offs in 
Labor Markets with Flexible Wages,"  Journal of Political  Economy,  vol. 88 (June 1980), 
pp. 526-38;  and J. E. Stiulitz,  "Prices and Queues as Screening Devices  in Competitive 
Markets," Technical Report 212 (Stanford University,  August 1976). 254  Brookings Papers  on Economnic  Activity,  1  :1988 
pendence  of productivity  on wages is that  optimal  wage levels may  occur 
at a point where there is an excess supply of labor. Lowering wages 
below this level is unprofitable  because any gains from  lower wages are 
offset by lower productivities.  In the efficiency wage condition, there- 
fore, unemployment  levels, rather  than labor supply levels, are related 
to the level of wages. This schedule  interacts  with the marginal  product 
of labor schedule, which depends on the financial  positions of firms, to 
yield a labor  market  equilibrium  condition  of the form 
li =  u(at),  u' <  0, 
where u  is  the unemployment rate. Together with the output and 
investment  functions  described  above, this  function  embodies  one simple 
variant  of the new Keynesian  model  whose implications  can  be measured 
against the broad business-cycle facts outlined in the first part of this 
paper. 
Goods  Markets.  The behavior of output in the system described 
above depends on the dynamic properties and interrelationships  of 
the financial  conditions of firms, described by their equity levels, at. 
Because these firms  have only limited  recourse  to public  equity  markets, 
the primary  means for changing  a firm's equity position is continuing 
cash flows from the firm's  operations. Because cash flow accumulates 
only slowly, there will be substantial  persistence in the response of 
output to either aggregate  supply or aggregate  demand  disturbances.80 
Since demand  disturbances  will be transmitted  from  firm  to firm  as each 
reduces output in response to unexpected equity losses, firm outputs 
will tend to move together. A shock that reduces the value of a firm's 
produjct,  for example, will lead to an immediate deterioration  of the 
firm's balance sheet position, since the values of all assets related to 
production  of the goods in question will fall, while the commitments 
incurred  in acquiring  these assets will not fall commensurately.81 This, 
in turn, will lead, as described above, to reductions in output and 
investment. Because the firm's  balance sheet position can be restored 
only slowly through  retained  earnings,  these reductions  in output and 
investment may be  significantly long-lived. At the same time, the 
80. The disturbances  may  also merely  redistribute  equity  among  firms  since, as noted 
in Greenwald  and Stiglitz, "Financial  Market  Imperfections  and Business Cycles," this 
too may  reduce  overall  output. 
81. If the firm's  debts  tend  to be denominated  in nominal  terms,  while  their  assets have 
real values (that is,  price-level-dependent  nominal values), then nominal monetary 
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reduction  in demand and output by one firm  will reduce the demands 
and outputs of other firms. Thus, all firms will tend to have common 
movements  in output. 
Furthermore,  if changes  in  investment  resulting  from  changes  in  firms' 
financial  positions  also include  investments  in activities  that  affect  future 
productivity,  then any temporary  deterioration  in the financial  position 
of firms  associated  with  a reduction  in output  may  have long-lived  effects 
similar  to those suggested  by table 1. 
The tendency  for fluctuations  in output  to have similar  magnitudes  is 
a natural  consequence of the equity-constrained  models. The response 
of a firm  to an unexpected  change  in market  conditions  depends  on how 
vulnerable  it is to such a change. For example, the equity positions of 
more  highly  leveraged  firms  will be more sensitive to demand  and price 
shocks than the equity positions of less highly leveraged firms. As a 
result, a more highly leveraged firm should reduce its  output and 
investment  (given the assumed  nature  of risk aversion)  in response to a 
given demand  shock more than a less highly  leveraged  firm.  However, 
if uncertainty  in the external  environment  were to decline, both types of 
firms  would  presumably  be willing  to make  themselves more  vulnerable 
to shocks in return  for other operating  efficiencies. Thus the magnitude 
of the response of firms  to shocks of a particular  size should  rise as the 
likely  magnitude  of shocks  falls. For  example,  if a successful  fiscal  policy 
program  were to soften external demand shocks, firms  might respond 
by increasing  their  debt-equity  ratios, by increasing  their  commitments 
to stabilize worker earnings and employment, or by operating with 
greater  fixed-to-variable  costs.82  The measure of the success of fiscal 
policy will then not be a reduction  in the amplitude  of cycles, but rather 
the efficiency  gains  from  changes  in firm  operating  methods. Hence, the 
long-run  tendency  in  capital-constrained  models  is for  output  fluctuations 
to converge  to a commion  level. 
As described  so far, the new Keynesian  model is specified  entirely  in 
real  terms, although  the existence of nominal  contracts  means, as in the 
traditional  Keynesian model, that changes in money supply may have 
real effects. Inflation rates would, therefore, depend largely on the 
dynamics of  monetary policy.  However, rigidities in relative, and 
sometimes  nominal,  prices do arise in the model. 
If firms  are imperfect  competitors  facing downward-sloping  demand 
82. See, for example, Greenwald  and Stiglitz, "Financial  Market  Imperfections  and 
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curves  of unknown  slope, then  the  uncertainty  over the effect of a change 
in price (arising, for example, from uncertainties  over competitor or 
consumer  reactions)  may  be greater  than  uncertainties  over the effect of 
a reduction in output (related solely to the effect on inventories and 
changes in stock-out probabilities).  If firms  are risk averse, the mix of 
price and quantity  changes chosen in response to a shift in demand  will 
be weighted in favor of the instrument  whose effect is less uncertain.83 
Under the circumstances  just described, this means a bias toward 
adjustments  in quantities  rather  than  prices and a degree  of short-term- 
price rigidity.  Indeed, an extensive literature  within  the new Keynesian 
tradition  has focused directly  on price  rigidities  due either  to menu  costs 
or to interfirm  interactions. In these models imperfect competition 
reinforces  the effect of uncertainties  associated with changing  prices by 
imposing  further  fixed  costs on price  change  decisions. In the menu  cost 
literature,  these are the costs of disseminating  new price information.84 
In the literature  on interfirm  interactions,  the costs are implicitly  asso- 
ciated with the possibility that competing firms may react to price 
changes in an undesirable  way.85  Still other sources of price rigidity 
under imperfect  competition  are cyclical variations  in the elasticity of 
demand86  and dynamic  trade-offs  between present and future  profits.87 
Though there are important  differences among the theories-some  of 
them providing  a more persuasive  theory of the observed patterns  than 
others-for  our purposes, what is more important  is the distinction 
between these theories  and those that assume perfect  price  flexibility. 
83. This  is the  firm  level  analog  of an  argument  made  by  William  Brainard,  "Uncertainty 
and the Effectiveness  of Policy,"  American Economic Review, vol. 57 (May 1967, Papers 
and Proceedings, 1966), pp. 411-25, in connection  with macroeconomic  policy instru- 
ments. 
84. See, for example, Akerlof  and Yellen, "A Near-Rational  Model  of the Business 
Cycle, with Wage  and Price Inertia";  Mankiw,  "Small  Menu  Costs and Large  Business 
Cycles"; and  Ball  and  Romer,  "Sticky  Prices  as Co-ordination  Failures." 
85. See, for example,  Stiglitz,  "Price  Rigidity  and  Market  Structure." 
86. See Hall, "The Relationship  between  Price  and  Marginal  Cost  in U.S. Industry." 
87. This arises  when the equity-constrained  model  of the firm  is applied  to a situation 
in which a firm's  future and current  demands  are positively related, as in Edmund  S. 
Phelps and Sidney G. Winter,  "Optimal  Price Policy under  Atomistic  Competition,"  in 
Edmund S. Phelps and others, Microeconomic  Foundations  of Employment and Inflation 
Theory  (W. W. Norton, 1970),  pp. 309-37. Higher  current  prices may improve  current 
profits,  but they reduce  future  sales by driving  away customers,  and hence lower future 
profits.  When  such a firm's  financial  position  deteriorates,  the value of uncertain  future 
profits  falls  relative  to the value  of current  profits.  As the value  of future  sales  falls, current 
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Capital  Markets. Investment  fluctuations  are disproportionately  large 
in the equity-constrained  models  primarily  because  deferring  investment 
is one of the least costly ways to reduce  the potential  risk  a firm  bears  as 
its financial  position deteriorates. When, as the result of a negative 
demand  shock, a firm's  equity position has deteriorated,  the part  of the 
marginal  cost of new investment  associated with the added  risk of that 
new investment may increase significantly.  The ability of the firm to 
accumulate  equity  over time  means  that,  on average,  this  risk  component 
of cost will decline over time. Deferring  investment  to such a later  time 
may, therefore,  be substantially  beneficial  to the firm. 
Adjustments  in the prices of investment  goods, in the face of shifts in 
investment goods demand, that might mitigate fluctuations  in actual 
investment are also limited in the equity-constrained  models. The 
demand  shock to the investment  goods-producing  sectors will worsen 
the financial  positions of firms  producing  investment  goods. Thus, their 
marginal  costs of output will rise, limiting  the extent of any demand- 
induced  reduction  in price. The extent to which this occurs will depend 
on both the initial  financial  positions  of the investment  goods-producing 
firms and the contract terms under which investment goods are pur- 
chased. For business construction, where output is purchased on an 
"'orders  basis" with extensive arrangements  for passing on supplier 
costs, the risks of additional  supply to the producing  firms should be 
relatively low.  Consequently, the impact of a deterioration  in their 
financial  positions on marginal  costs should be relatively limited. In 
residential  construction,  where firms  often produce  without  prior  sales 
and where many firms are small and highly leveraged, the impact on 
marginal  costs of a demand  shock may  be substantial.  Thus, the equity- 
constrained model is able to account, at least in principle, for the 
relatively  high  volatility  of residential  construction. 
A second factor  in the disproportionate  volatility  of investment  in the 
equity-constrained  model arises from any permanent  effect of a tempo- 
rary disturbance on productivity, due, for example, to a decline in 
technology  spillovers  as firms  reduce  effective  research  and  development 
activity. However, the response of investment  to any such fluctuations, 
both in terms of planned  and actual  investment,  will be gradual  as firms 
accumulate  the equity necessary to absorb  the risks of the new invest- 
ment.  Thus,  investment  responses  from  this  cause should  be less extreme 
than  those  associated  with  real  business-cycle  models  without  any  capital 
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The Labor Market. In the new Keynesian model outlined above, 
wages should  vary  procyclically,  as they  appear  to do, since  deterioration 
in a firm's  net asset position  reduces  the marginal  product  of labor  (taking 
account of the risk associated with increasing  output). Efficiency  wage 
considerations  move workers  off their  supply  curves  in response  to these 
shifts in demand, inducing more variation in employment and less 
variation  in  wage  levels than  microeconomic  labor  supply  considerations 
suggest. This is especially true of short-term  adjustments.  If firms  are 
more certain of the effects of labor force adjustments  than of wage 
adjustments  (because  of efficiency  wage  considerations),  then  temporary 
cyclical adjustments  will fall more heavily on employment  than wages. 
This too is consistent with the data. Measured productivity  changes 
should, in the absence of fixed costs, vary countercyclically  in the new 
Keynesian model as they do in the traditional  Keynesian model and as 
they do not in the data. However, the existence of significant  fixed  costs 
would eliminate  this discrepancy. 
The rigidities introduced  in the process of wage determination  by 
efficiency wage considerations  create unemployment  fluctuations  and 
involuntary  separations  in response to shifts in the labor  demand  curve 
just as nominal  rigidities  do in the traditional  Keynesian models. Since 
persistent fluctuations  in the net marginal  product of labor arise from 
persistent  shifts  in the balance  sheet positions  of firms,  the new Keynes- 
ian model yields persistent unemployment.  Efficiency wage theories, 
unlike conventional  implicit  contract theories, explain why the reduc- 
tions in demand  for labor  should  take, at least in part,  the form  of layoffs 
rather  than  just a reduction  in hours  worked. 
A further  source of persistence in unemployment  arises if firms  bear 
fixed costs of training  workers  for  jobs. Under  these conditions  a hiring 
decision has the characteristics  of an investment  decision and, as is the 
case in other investment decisions, deterioration  in a firm's equity 
position  will make  the hiring  decision attractive  only at a low wage level 
(corresponding  to a low price level for other investment  goods). Thus 
the wages for employed workers and the wages that firms would be 
willing  to offer  for new workers  are  markedly  different.  This "marginal" 
wage may be so low that it lies below the reservation  wage of workers; 
that  is, workers  are  better  off waiting  a  period,  when  the  capital  constraint 
is likely  to be less binding.  Just  as firms  postpone  investment  in machines 
during  recessions, workers  postpone investment  in new  jobs. Note that 
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may increase.88  Of course, efficiency wage considerations  explain why 
firms  may not lower the marginal  wage. To put it another  way, given the 
capital  constraints  and the dependence  of productivity  on wages, there 
is no wage that firms can offer for which it is desirable to hire new 
workers.89 
The preceding  discussion of the new Keynesian model does not, it 
should  be stressed again, do full  justice to the range  of work  being done 
under  this rubric.  Perhaps  most important,  no attempt  has been made  to 
incorporate directly the assumptions of the several menu cost  and 
imperfect  competition approaches. We exclude these approaches not 
because they have not identified  significant  aspects of macroeconomic 
behavior.  Rather,  it is sufficient  to use only a single variant  of the new 
Keynesian  approach  for comparison  with the simple  real  business-cycle 
model and the simple traditional  Keynesian model used above. In 
addition, the policy implications of the new Keynesian models are 
broadly  similar.  Like the traditional  Keynesian  model, they provide  for 
a positive role for active aggregate  demand  management  policies.90 
Concluding  Remarks 
We have argued  here that assessing the validity of different  macro- 
economic  theories  requires  the identification  of a set of critical  tests that 
a good theory  must  pass. A good, complete  theory  must  provide  insights 
into all of these phenomena and, more importantly, should not be 
inconsistent  with any. Of course, some theories are building  blocks, to 
be incorporated  into a more  complete theory. Efficiency  wage theory is 
one such: it does not purport  to explain the fluctuations  in aggregate 
demand. 
88. This  theory  addresses  itself to the participation  decision, not to the hours  puzzle. 
89. The capital-constrained  theories  also explain  why workers  will not accept contin- 
gency pay, that  is, why a promise  to pay higher  wages in the future  will be unacceptable. 
Such  promises  are  equivalent  to a form  of equity. 
We should  note that  insider-outsider  theory  also is partially  addressed  to these issues. 
See, for example, Assar Lindbeck  and Dennis J. Snower, "Cooperation,  Harassment, 
and Involuntary  Unemployment:  An Insider-Outsider  Approach,"  American Economic 
Review, vol. 78 (March  1988),  pp. 167-88. 
90. Although  the prescriptions  are  broadly  similar,  they  differ  in detail  and  in  measures 
of policy  success. For  example,  for the model  described  here  even a successful  stabilizing 
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Table 15.  Success of Alternative Theories in Explaining Basic Characteristics 
of Business Cycles 
Real  Traditional  New 
Chlaracteristic  business-cycle  Keynesian  Keynesian 
Goods market 
Nature of output  fluctuations  Partial  Partial  Yes 
Common  magnitude  of output 
fluctuations  Yes  No  Yes 
Price rigidities  No  Partial  Partial 
Capital  market 
Investment  fluctuations  Partial  Partial  Yes 
Labor market 
Cyclical movements  in wages, hours, 
employment  No  No  Partial 
Unemployment  and layoffs  No  Yes  Yes 
There  are  simply  too many  degrees  of freedom,  relative  to the  available 
data, to discriminate  among alternative macroeconomic theories by 
looking  at one, or a few, macroeconomic  phenomena.  Indeed, discrim- 
inating  among  theories will probably  require  incorporating  microecon- 
ometric  observations:just  as macroeconomic  theory  and  microeconomic 
theory should  rest on similar  assumptions  and  foundations,  macroecon- 
ometric evidence should not be evaluated  independently  of the micro- 
econometric  evidence. 
We have proposed a possible set of such tests and attempted to 
compare  these stylized  facts with  stylized  versions  of traditional  Keynes- 
ian theories, new Keynesian  theories, and real business-cycle theories. 
Table 15 describes in broad terms how successful each of the three 
theoretical approaches is in explaining the general characteristics  of 
business cycles identified  in the first part of this paper in each of the 
three  markets-goods, capital,  and  labor-that make  up the macroecon- 
omy. The real business-cycle approach  is fully successful in explaining 
the stylized facts in none of the markets, especially that for labor. 
Traditional  Keynesian  approaches  appear  not to do significantly  better. 
A new Keynesian approach  is better. However, no model-at  least in 
the simple variants  presented  here-successfully  explains all the data. 
Whether  there are additional  crucial  tests that these theories  will fail or 
that will necessitate major  modifications  of the theory  remain  questions 
for future  research. Comments 
and Discussion 
Robert E. Hall: The most basic issues raised  by Bruce  Greenwald  and 
Joseph  Stiglitz  appear  in the following  simple  labor  market  diagram: 
Real wage 




Shifts  in labor  demand  are the driving  force of employment  fluctuations. 
Effective labor supply is highly elastic, and the effective labor supply 
schedule  is stable.  The  real  wage  is only slightly  procyclical.  The  diagram 
accounts for the two most important  empirical regularities  cited by 
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Greenwald  and Stiglitz:  significant  output  and employment  fluctuations 
and small  real  wage fluctuations. 
An interesting  feature  of the current  state of macroeconomic  thinking 
is  the importance of  this diagram. In the fixed-price analysis that 
dominated  mainstream  macroeconomics  until recently, the diagram  is 
irrelevant. One of the most important  lessons of Robert Barro and 
Herschel  Grossman  is that  the labor  market  is not generally  on either  of 
the curves  in the figure.  1 Mainstream  macroeconomic  textbooks  develop 
an elaborate body of analysis before they ever get to labor market 
equilibrium,  which is presented  as relevant  only to long-run  analysis or 
to a fictitious  flexible-price  economy. In the new macroeconomics,  the 
basic diagram  of labor  market  equilibrium  is the starting  point. 
The task of the macroeconomist  within the general framework  of 
Greenwald  and Stiglitz is twofold: explain why the demand  curve for 
labor  shifts and  why the effective labor supply  curve is so elastic. Their 
paper  criticizes the real business-cycle answers to these questions and 
advocates what they call new Keynesian answers. Briefly, the real 
business-cycle school says that the labor demand  curve shifts because 
of vibrations in the production function, which cause shifts of the 
marginal  product  of labor.  Effective  labor  supply  is highly  elastic  because 
workers  store  up memories  of past time  off or because of nonconvexities 
in the technology.2 The new Keynesian answers are that the labor 
demand  curve shifts because of random  variations  in equity, and the 
effective labor supply schedule is highly elastic because of efficiency 
wage considerations. 
I find the Greenwald-Stiglitz  paper refreshing  because it avoids the 
single-minded  attention  of mainstream  macroeconomic  theory to mon- 
etary driving  forces and nominal  rigidities.  Although  monetary  shocks 
could be one of the sources of  shifts in labor demand, the model 
contemplates  many others that are real. Because the evidence on the 
importance  of monetary  driving  forces is ambiguous,  this broadening  is 
desirable. 
1.  Robert J.  Barro and Herschel  I.  Grossman,  Money,  Employment  and Inflation 
(Cambridge  University  Press, 1976). 
2.  See Finn E. Kydland  and Edward  C. Prescott, "Time to Build and Aggregate 
Fluctuations,"  Econometrica,  vol. 50 (November  1982),  pp. 1345-70;  Richard  Rogerson, 
"Indivisible  Labor,  Lotteries  and  Equilibrium,"  Journal  of Monetary  Economics,  vol. 21 
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Greenwald  and  Stiglitz  write  as if there  were a huge  gulf  between their 
own model and  the real  business-cycle model, a gulf as great  as the one 
between  Keynes and  the  classics. They  could  equally  well  have  portrayed 
themselves as members  of the real  business-cycle school. They contrib- 
ute new theories within the general framework  that applies standard 
tools of equilibrium  analysis  to macroeconomic  questions.  A model  with 
financial  rather  than  technological  shifts as the source of movements  in 
the demand  for labor would be taken seriously by real business-cycle 
theorists. Efficiency wages are a more significant  deviation from the 
competitive  analysis  that  pervades  the real  business-cycle school, but it 
may not be essential to Greenwald  and  Stiglitz's  message. A much  more 
significant  watershed  in macroeconomics,  in my opinion,  is between the 
real school, which includes Prescott and Greenwald-Stiglitz,  and the 
nominal  school, represented  by Ball, Mankiw,  and  Romer.3 
Greenwald  and Stiglitz  repeat  the standard  criticism  of the Kydland- 
Prescott  real  business-cycle  model:  the model  relies on vibrations  of the 
production  function as its driving  force, which means that it explains 
major  cyclical contractions  as times of technical regress. If the accu- 
mulation  of knowledge is monotonic, regress cannot occur. I find this 
criticism  convincing,  if not at all novel, so I am receptive to the paper's 
mission  of finding  other  driving  forces. 
Greenwald  and Stiglitz's other criticisms of the real business-cycle 
model fall short of the mark.  First, they claim as a general  matter  that 
competition  tends to dampen  fluctuations.  One of the main  points of the 
real business-cycle authors  is that elastic supply is what it takes to get 
realistic  volatility  in employment  and output. Interestingly,  Greenwald 
and Stiglitz do not dispute the basic high elasticity of labor supply that 
makes  the real  business-cycle model  work. 
Second, Greenwald  and  Stiglitz  repeat  a criticism  that  has been made 
many  times before  and  taken  seriously  by Barro  and  others sympathetic 
to real  business-cycle  thinking:  consumption  of goods and  consumption 
of leisure ought to move in parallel  over the cycle. That  is, when some 
force makes consumption fall, hours of work should rise. In fact, 
consumption  and hours of work are somewhat  positively correlated  in 
3.  See Edward  C. Prescott,  "Theory  ahead  of Business-Cycle  Measurement,"  in Karl 
Brunner and Allan H.  Meltzer,  eds.,  Real Business  Cycles,  Real  Exchange  Rates  and 
Actual Policies (Amsterdam:  North-Holland,  1986),  pp. 11-44; and Laurence  Ball, N. 
Gregory  Mankiw,  and David  Romer, "The New Keynesian  Economics  and the Output- 
Inflation  Trade-off,"  pp. 1-65, in this issue. 264  Brookintgs Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
most economies. A simple  explanation,  harmonious  with the real busi- 
ness-cycle model, is that shifts in preferences  are an important  driving 
force. If consumers  postpone consumption  because of a decline in time 
preference, then both consumption and work effort should fall in an 
equilibrium  model. This view gets some support  from  the fact that  when 
output and employment  rise in response to an exogenous increase in 
demand  (say, military  spending),  consumption  does not rise. 
Greenwald and Stiglitz mark down the real business-cycle model 
because of its inability  to explain  something  they call price rigidity.  The 
persistence of inflation  is not in dispute, but the real business-cycle 
model  has no problem  explaining  the persistence.  The monetary  author- 
ity freely chooses the price level in the real business-cycle model, with 
no need to worry  about  real  effects of monetary  policy. In that  situation, 
highly persistent inflation  (ideally at a zero rate) would be the norm. 
Barro's evidence on the correlation  of real activity with surprises in 
money growth  presents no problems  to a real business-cycle interpre- 
tation.4 
With  respect to the model that Greenwald  and Stiglitz  would-like  to 
erect in place of the real business-cycle model, in my opinion  the most 
successful element is the suggestion that equity rationing  and other 
financial  considerations  can shift the demand  curve for labor. Although 
financial  mechanisms  may  ultimately  prove  to account  for  only a fraction 
of cyclical shifts in labor  demand,  I would  guess that  they are at least as 
important  as shifts  in the production  function.  The explanation  of highly 
elastic  labor  supply  in the  paper  is sketchy  and  unsatisfying.  Firms  prefer 
employment  adjustments  to wage adjustments  because they are more 
certain  of the effects. Much  work needs to be done to convince me that 
the theory  is sound  and  the phenomenon  is quantitatively  important. 
To my mind,  Greenwald  and  Stiglitz  are moving  in the right  direction. 
By applying  standard  tools of analysis in an equilibrium  framework  to 
questions of macroeconomic  fluctuations,  they are creating  a body of 
macroeconomic  theory that will make sense to economists generally.  I 
see Greenwald  and Stiglitz as highly complementary  to the important 
activities of  the real business-cycle school.  In particular, they are 
replacing  unrealistic  assumptions  of that school with assumptions  that 
are closer to reality  for modern  economies. 
4.  Robert J. Barro, "Unanticipated  Money,  Output, and the Price Level in the United 
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Stanley Fischer: The last decade has seen an explosion of analytic 
models that aim to  lay  microeconomic foundations for Keynesian 
macroeconomics-the  macroeconomics in which aggregate demand 
affects output,  in which high  unemployment  is inefficient,  and in which 
stabilization  policy can be Pareto-improving.  In some combinations,  or 
even taken together,  these models begin to constitute  the new Keynes- 
ianism:  microeconomic-based  realistic  macroeconomics,  realistic  in the 
sense of the non-Friedman  methodology  of positive economics that  sees 
virtue  in some correspondence  between the assumptions  of models and 
the real  world. 
One particular  combination of models that has been called new 
Keynesian  is associated  with George  Akerlof  and  Janet  Yellen, Gregory 
Mankiw, Olivier Blanchard, and Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, and others.' It 
consists of imperfect competition plus small menu costs of changing 
prices in the goods markets  and of efficiency wage assumptions  on the 
labor market side. The goods markets assumptions produce some 
nominal  price inertia;  the labor  markets  assumptions  produce  real  wage 
inertia;  and the model may accordingly  generate  real effects of changes 
in nominal  demand.  Promising  as this model  is, there  are some questions 
about its ability  to produce  real effects of changes in nominal  demand: 
Andrew  Caplin  and  Daniel  Spulber  have shown  that  nominal  price  inertia 
at the microeconomic  level does not necessarily add up to aggregate 
price level inertia,  and  efficiency  wage theory in an economy where the 
efficiency  wage is motivated  by morale  does not lead to real  wage inertia 
without  supplementary  assumptions  about  conventional  attitudes  to real 
wage changes.2 Despite these difficulties, the model does quite well 
overall. 
Prominent  among the new Keynesian contributions  is a series of 
analytic  papers  by Greenwald  and Stiglitz, and by Stiglitz  and Andrew 
Weiss  that  have  focused  on apparently  nonneoclassical  features  of goods, 
1. George  A. Akerlof  and Janet  L. Yellen, "A Near-Rational  Model  of the Business 
Cycle, with Wage and Price Inertia," Quarterly Journal  of Economics,  vol. 100  (1985, 
Supplement),  pp. 823-38;  N. Gregory  Mankiw,  "Small  Menu  Costs and Large  Business 
Cycles: A Macroeconomic  Model of Monopoly," Quarterly Journal of Economics,  vol. 
100  (May  1985),  pp.529-37;  OlivierJean  Blanchard  and  Nobuhiro  Kiyotaki,  "Monopolistic 
Competition  and  the Effects  of Aggregate  Demand,"  American Economic Reviewl, vol. 77 
(September  1987),  pp. 647-66. 
2. Andrew S. Caplin and Daniel F. Spulber, "Menu Costs and the Neutrality of 
Money," Quarterly Journal of Economics,  vol. 102  (November  1987),  pp. 703-25. 266  Brookings Papers  otn Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
labor, and financial  markets:  notably  credit  rationing,  equity rationing, 
efficiency wages, and search in the goods markets producing  kinked 
demand  curves.3  The careful  readers of these papers-and  because of 
their volume no single person can absorb them all-must  have been 
impressed  by their creativity  and the sense that the papers  were about 
real phenomena. But it was difficult to know how and whether the 
contributions  added  up and how much they individually  contributed  to 
explaining  the broad  features  of the business cycle. 
The present paper by Greenwald  and Stiglitz is an attempt  to dem- 
onstrate  the ability  of their  particular  version of the new Keynesianism 
to explain  the broad  features  of the business cycle. The model  combines 
efficiency wages in the labor  market  with equity rationing  in the assets 
markets-with the equity  rationing  feeding  back  into  the  goods and  labor 
markets.  The methodology  is to compare  three  oversimplified  models  of 
the business cycle to see which best captures  some of the stylized  facts. 
There is a great danger  in this game that the authors  do not bend over 
backward  to be favorable  to the competing  approaches  and  hard  on their 
own contribution,  and it is easy to detect some forward-leaning  in this 
paper. 
One  puzzling  set offacts that  should  be taken  into  account  in  discussing 
real  business-cycle  or  more  generally  equilibrium  theories  is the seasonal 
business cycle. Jeffrey Miron  has shown that many of the phenomena 
seen in  the business  cycle-for  instance,  significant  movements  in output 
and  inputs  without  large  changes  in prices-are  also part  of the seasonal 
cycle.4  Yet we do not usually  regard  the seasonal  cycle as anything  other 
than  an equilibrium  phenomenon,  which raises questions  about some of 
the evidence on the nature  of the business cycle. 
One of the important  benefits of this paper is that Greenwald  and 
Stiglitz  have reduced  the equity rationing  model to two equations. The 
description  is simple.  The quantity  of goods supplied  at a given  real  wage 
is a function of the amount of equity the firm has. So is the rate of 
investment. In Greenwald and Stiglitz's equations summarizing  the 
model,  at is described as real holdings of equity.  Is this really what the 
theory  requires?  It would seem that some measure  of the firm's  liquidity 
or cash holdings should belong in that equation. One of the areas in 
3. See Stiglitz  and Andrew  Weiss, "Macroeconomic  Equilibrium  and Credit  Ration- 
ing," Working  Paper  2164  (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  February  1987). 
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which one would like to see the Greenwald-Stiglitz  paper  developed is 
to explain more clearly what determines  the shadow  price of capital  or 
liquidity.  Isn't  that  the variable  that  would  affect  the firm's  supply  curve? 
And if so, shouldn't  it also be related to the interest rate at which the 
firm  can borrow? 
It is also true that theirs is an entirely real model. It is accordingly 
very difficult  to see what it can say about  nominal  inertia. 
Now, what does one make  of this model?  The basic argument  is that 
finance  matters,  not  only  for  investment  and  lherefore  aggregate  demand, 
but  also for aggregate  supply.  It is thus  part  of a long tradition  going  back 
to Congressman  Wright  Patman,  Leon Keyserling, and Domingo Cav- 
allo. There  have been many  attempts  to estimate  aggregate  models with 
interest  rate effects on aggregate  supply,  without  great  success. Almost 
certainly  those models have misspecified  the cost of capital.  One would 
like to see this model developed in that  direction. 
In addition,  the model has strong  cross-sectional  implications.  Some 
of those-relating to investment-appear to have been tested by Steven 
Fazzari,  Glenn  Hubbard,  and  Bruce  Petersen,  with  reasonably  favorable 
results.5  Others imply that fluctuations  in output should be greater  for 
firms  that have less access to the capital  markets.  If we interpret  those 
as small  firms,  that  proposition  too should  be testable. 
Whether  this particular  model does better than the competitive new 
Keynesian model cannot really be judged from the evidence here. I 
would,doubt  it. I also doubt  that  the authors  are  right  to argue  that  adding 
their  imperfection  to that  of the  Akerlof-Yellen  model  would  be a mistake. 
They argue against  epicycles, or putting  too much in a model, but the 
point at which one begins to hit epicycles in this computer  age may be 
further  down the complexity  tree than  it used to be. 
General Discussion 
David Romer suggested that business-cycle models were usefully 
distinguished  by whether  they exhibited  monetary  neutrality  and  whether 
5.  Steven  Fazzari,  R. Glenn  Hubbard,  and  Bruce  C. Petersen,"  Financing  Constraints 
and Corporate  Investment," Working  Paper  2387 (NBER, September 1987). See also 
Fazzari,  Hubbard,  and  Petersen,  "Financing  Constraints  and  Corporate  Investment,"  pp. 
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they  assumed  perfectly  competitive  markets.  He noted  that  real  business- 
cycle models did both. The authors'  model was realistic  in not treating 
all markets  as competitive.  But unlike  some other  recent  business-cycle 
models, such as the Ball, Mankiw, Romer model presented in this 
volume, it took no stand on monetary  neutrality.  Romer  regarded  this 
as an important  drawback  because such a model could not explain  why 
Paul Volcker's monetary  policy had been so important.  Alan Blinder 
felt that the nonneutrality  of central  bank  policy, which may not be the 
same  as the nonneutrality  of money, should  be regarded  as a central  fact 
of the economy, disagreeing  with Robert  Hall's view that nonneutrality 
of money should  be regarded  as a sideshow in new Keynesian models. 
James Tobin agreed, asserting that it was important  for theoretical 
models  to explain  why U.S. monetary  policy seems far  from  neutral.  He 
observed that at least six of the nine postwar U.S. recessions were the 
result of anti-inflationary  monetary policy. He regarded  the negative 
reaction  of the stock market  to news of inflation  as further  evidence of 
the potency of monetary  policy. The financial  markets  believe that the 
Federal  Reserve  will reduce  the present  value  of earnings  while attempt- 
ing to reduce inflation.  Greenwald  reasoned that this nonneutrality  of 
central bank policy reflects the uncertainty generated by inflation, 
exacerbated  by uncertainty  about the reaction  of monetary  policy. He 
agreed  that nonneutrality  of central  bank  policy could be regarded  as a 
central fact about the economy, but explained that it was beyond the 
scope of the present  paper  to evaluate  models  by that criterion. 
Several participants  suggested that it made little difference  whether 
the source of nonneutrality  was modeled to arise from nominal debt 
contracts  rather  than  nominal  wage contracts  or other sources of sticky 
prices. Robert  Hall  noted  that  there  is a fundamental  difference  between 
the standard  treatment  of wage rigidity  and  the way debt is modeled. He 
disagreed with the standard view,  embodied in the Fischer-Taylor 
contracting  model, that a nominal wage contract is a call option on 
workers'  time  with  a nominal  striking  price. He did  not  believe that  firms 
take advantage  of unexpected inflation  by employing  more labor  at the 
lower  real  wage. Hence, he suggested  that  nominal  wage contracts  could 
be analyzed the way nominal  debt is. Because both constitute a large 
fixed nominal  burden  for firms, inflationary  monetary  policy can have 
large distributional  effects favoring  firms.  Tobin wondered  why, if this 
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Fischer noted that there are two quite separate  issues. One is whether 
the labor  contract  is in nominal  terms.  The other  is whether  the firm  has 
the right  to set the employment  level at whatever  nominal  wage has been 
set in advance.  There  is nothing  that  applies  to explaining  why the labor 
contract  is set in nominal  terms that does not also apply to explaining 
why debts are denominated  in nominal  terms. 
An extensive discussion  centered  on the driving  forces of the models. 
One potential  driving  force for the authors'  model is the nonneutrality 
of money. However, Greenwald  reasoned  that  the model  was correct  in 
deemphasizing  the source of shocks, stressing instead how shocks are 
amplified  due to imperfect competition. He argued that the market's 
failure to stabilize shocks was at the heart of Keynes's thinking. By 
contrast, real business-cycle models are set in a perfectly competitive 
world so there is no way for shocks to be amplified.  Therefore it is 
incumbent  on those models  to suggest  a plausible  source  of large  shocks. 
Discussion turned  to whether technology shocks could be accepted 
as the primary  driving  force in real  business-cycle models. Martin  Baily 
did not think the explanation could be ruled out simply because it 
required negative productivity shocks. Such measured productivity 
changes could reflect  factors other than technology, such as changes in 
the cost of imported  materials  or new regulations.  George  von Fursten- 
berg agreed, pointing out that Prescott and other proponents of real 
business-cycle models associate productivity shocks with the Solow 
residual  of growth  accounting,  which does sometimes  take on negative 
values. Hall countered  that  the Solow residual  mismeasures  shifts  in the 
production function in the presence of imperfect competition. The 
problem  arises  because  the Solow calculation  assumes  that  the elasticity 
of output  with respect to labor  is equal  to labor's share  of output. Under 
imperfect  competition,  the real  wage is less than  the marginal  product  of 
labor, so labor's share underestimates  the elasticity of output with 
respect  to labor. Hence reductions  in labor  input  are mistakenly  associ- 
ated with downward  shifts of the production  function. When  imperfect 
competition  is allowed  for, negative shocks disappear.  Thus we are still 
unable  to explain  reductions  in output  by productivity  shocks. 
Edmund  Phelps wondered why positive productivity  shocks would 
not quickly dwarf  any recession caused by the process outlined in the 
authors'  model. Greenwald  explained that productivity  is endogenous 
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Fischer argued that a major  point of the model is the importance  of 
imperfections  in the capital  market;  he felt there  was little  in the  empirical 
evidence  of the paper  to back  up  that  theoretical  point. Blinder  wondered 
why, if the capital market  were so important,  the October 1987 stock 
market  crash  had  so little  effect on the  economy. Baily  was not convinced 
that the authors' model would generate the flat supply locus that Hall 
described. Baily asked why high unemployment  would not allow firms 
to lower  the real  wage  while  retaining  worker  efficiency.  In  this situation, 
the unemployment  rate itself should  motivate  workers  who retain  their 
jobs. Greenwald  maintained  that  unemployment  tends  to lag  the  business 
cycle so that the incentive effect of high unemployment  may come too 
late. Furthermore  he felt that cutting  workers  was a much  easier short- 
run  solution  for managers  than  cutting  wages. 
Greg  Mankiw  and Hall disagreed  about the cyclical behavior  of real 
wages in a real business-cycle  model. Mankiw  argued  that such models 
would  predict  strongly  procyclical  real  wages and  were therefore  subject 
to the original  Dunlop-Tarshis  criticism  of Keynes, that real wages are 
not very cyclical. Hall observed that special features of these models, 
such as lags of leisure in utility, could make the labor supply schedule 
flat in the short run. Greenwald agreed with Hall, adding that the 
extremely procyclical behavior  of real interest rates is a more serious 
shortcoming  of real  business-cycle models. 
Robert  Gordon  wondered  why the fix price  equilibrium  version  of the 
old Keynesian models had been ignored. Those models explain every- 
thing that the new Keynesian models do and withstand the Dunlop- 
Tarshis  criticism.  They are old Keynesian because they do not provide 
a microeconomic  basis for the fixity of wages and  prices. Furthermore, 
he noted that Hall's flat supply locus does not apply to the fix price 
models. 
Sims objected to the methodological  fad of looking at a few stylized 
facts. He was disappointed  that predictions  of the stochastic behavior 
of certain  variables  were not presented  for each of the models. He found 
the  usual  evaluation  of real  business-cycle  models  to be more  satisfactory 
in that  respect. 